ملف ١٩٢٤/١٧٠٧ "الجزيره العربية - تقارير عن الوضع في جدة. (١٩٢٤-١٩٣٠)" [و‎‎٤‎٤‎٣] (٨٩٨/٨٩٠)

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[February 19.]
Section 1,
1924- J
EASTERN (Arabia).
CONFIDENTIAL.
\E 1532/424/91] No. 1.
Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—[Received February 19.)
(No. 9. Secret.)
r i Jeddah, January 29, 1924.
I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the Jeddah report for the period
the 1st to the 29th January.
Copies of this despatch and report are being sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem,
j Delhi, Aden and Beyrout (for communication to Damascus).
I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD.
Enclosure in No. 1
Jeddah Report, January 1-29, 1924.
(Secret.)
THE absence of King Hussein has not brought to his people the sense of relief
that might have been expected, for to a system as centralised as that of Louis XIV (and
worked with as much indifference to the eventual deluge), King Hussein adds an
instrument which Louis XIV never knew—wireless telegraphy. Mecca and Jeddah are
full of spies, the wireless works indefatigably ; and there is no doubt that the King is
keeping himself well informed on Hedjaz affairs during his absence. This facility of
communication, however, does not make it possible to get anything done, and, after a
few half-hearted efforts, we have postponed until the King’s return all questions of
importance. Many ludicrous instances are reported of the unwullingness oL Hedjaz
officials to take any responsibility upon themselves. Perhaps the most absurd was
afforded by the Commandant of Jeddah, who refused to restore to its position a survey
stone which we had seen being rolled away by Arabs from its place not far from the
barracks, but said that if we would put the stone back he would go so far as to put a
sentry over it.
Bin Baud.
The Wahabi wave is undoubtedly spreading. To the north Kheibar has been in
their hands for some time and there have been several attacks on the railway line. In
the Taif area hostilities, though on a small scale, are of frequent occurrence. Taif
has been surrounded with a ring of forts which King Hussein has garrisoned with a
considerable force—said to be 7,000 men—composed of the best of such fighting
material as the Hedjaz can produce. The Wahabis are even believed to be in possession
of Sufainah and Suwairkiyah on the Mecca-Medina road. The normal position on the
railway line is that the Hedjaz garrisons cannot venture out of the stations for fear of
the Wahabis, and the Wahabis cannot capture the stations for lack of guns and
machine guns. At present the balance of forces on the railway is in King Hussein’s
favour, because of the considerable force he has organised for the recapture of Kheibar.
It seems possible that Kkeibar may not be attacked at present, as Bin Saud, in deference
to the known wishes of His Majesty’s Government, has ordered his people not to attack
the Hedjaz, and King Hussein has been persuaded, since he arrived at Amman, to
promise not to attack the Wahabis unless he is provoked. The King has also been
persuaded to appoint the Amir Zaid to represent him at the Koweit Conference,
though at present with the fantastic condition that each Arab ruler (except, of course,
the Sherif of Mecca) should be restored to his pre-war boundaries. I his involves,
with other things, that Hail should be restored to the Rashid family, i.e., that Bin Saud
should restore to King Hussein’s influence a prize for which he has fought ever since
he became Amir of Nejd.
The appointment of Hamzah-al-Ghauth as one of the Nejd representatives at the
Koweit Conference led to a revival by the Irak delegates of the charge that Hamzah
was guilty of the theft of valuable articles from the Prophet’s tomb at Medina. This
charge has never been believed in the Hedjaz ; it was probably trumped up by King
Hussein because of political differences. The best proof of this view is that the Amir
Eaisal retained Hamzah in a position of importance at Damascus long after his father had
[526 t—1]