ملف ١٩٢٤/١٧٠٧ "الجزيره العربية - تقارير عن الوضع في جدة. (١٩٢٤-١٩٣٠)" [و‎‎٢‎٤‎٦] (٨٩٨/٤٩٦)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty ’s Government.]
EASTERN (Arabia).
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[September 20, 1926.]
CONFIDENTIAL.
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Section 2.
[E 5400/367/91]
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—No. "L ' —
Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir AvMen Chamberlain.—(Received September 20.)
(No. 106. Secret.)
Sir
T tt A vtt v. 4. £ ■ J sdddh^ ke'ptGmbev 3, 1926.
±i VL the honour to forward herewith my report on the situation in the
Hejaz during the period the lst-31st August, 1926/ 1 on m the
SimlfXTrfww 8 n eP ° rt b ill ng sent t? E gyPG Jerusalem (2), Bagdad, Aden,
bimia, Beirut (for Damascus), Khartum (through Port Sudan) and Singapore.
I have, &c.
S. R. JORDAN.
Enclosure 1 in No. 1.
Jeddah Report for the Period August 1-31, 1926.
SINGE the completion of the pilgrimage and the World’s Moslem Conference
at Mecca, from which Ibn Sand apparently learned that he must rely upon his own
resources and not the assistance of the many other sects of Islam to bring about the
improvements and modifications considered essential in the Hejaz, the local
authorities have been showing considerable activity in the reorganisation of the
various Government Departments. Customs, Municipalities, Health Administra
tion, and^the army have all had a share.
2. Ihe military situation during the period under report has undergone a
very favourable change on account of the settlement of the dispute between Ibn Saud
and^ the Bani Malik and the Dukhana Arab tribes, these latter erroneously reported
as ' c Tihana ” in my last report.
The first forces Ibn Saud sent against these tribes after their revolt were
defeated, and Ibn Saud thereupon collected a strong force with which to subdue
them, but before despatching this force, sent a message calling upon the leading
sheikhs of the two tribes to come to Mecca, or he would take action against them.
The sheikhs obeyed, and upon arrival in Mecca explained that the cause of
their revolt and the reason why they attacked the caravan and robbed the money, &c., j
was because a number of the members of this caravan molested them and assaulted
some of their women.
The King, hearing their explanation, congratulated them upon their actions,
and assured them that if they had not killed the malefactors he should have had
them killed himself. He also awarded the tribes compensation, and the whole matter
has been settled satisfactorily and to the delight of both parties.
3. Since the completion of the pilgrimage the authorities have been actively
engaged in enlisting recruits for the army. These are being offered a small salary
and given an Ikhwan dress, i.e., Abbaya and Wahabi head-dress, and are being
trained in the use of arms.
The many pieces of cannons and all the more modern field-guns which were in
Jeddah have been transported to Mecca or beyond, and it would appear as if Ibn
Saud has some definite idea and motive for this concentration and the organisation
of a fighting force.
Not only is voluntary enlistment solicited, but the sheikhs of the various
quarters of the towns are ordered to supply so many men according to the size and
population of their various quarters.
There seems little doubt but that these forces will be either for the repulse of
the Yemen forces should they advance further into the Asir, or for what is more
probable still, the garrisoning of Asir, as it is becoming more evident that both the
Imam of Yemen and Ibn Baud have decided that the Idrissi must cease to exist as an
independent ruler, and are going to divide the country between them. In this respect
I would particularly draw attention to the significance of the statement made to me
by Suleiman Pasha Shafik in a recent conversation set out under the political section 4
of this report.
[1395 u—2]
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