ملف ١٩٢٤/١٧٠٧ "الجزيره العربية - تقارير عن الوضع في جدة. (١٩٢٤-١٩٣٠)" [ظ‎‎٢‎١‎٩] (٨٩٨/٤٤٣)

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Jeddah in order to make them advance the money themselves and take their chance
of recovering it subsequently from the Egyptian Government He has even gone so
far as to express a foolish threat, which, however not even Sheikh Yussef Yassin
would be blindly consistent enough to carry out, to detain the next Khedivial pilgrim
ship unless his demands are met. He made this threat unofficially on the telephone
to the Khedivial agent, and when asked to repeat it backed out.
5. Similarly, when the Eastern Telegraph Company s ship the Mirror came
to Jeddah to carry out the repair of the Jeddah—Port Sudan submarine cable, he
made an attempt to hold up her work until he had received through this agency a
definite promise from the Sudan Government to pay by a given hate the sums due
to the Heiaz in respect of certain accumulations of cable fees, ihese sums were
mentioned in the Cable Agreement, and were therefore due the moment the agreement
was signed by all parties. But, either suspecting that a promise to pay did not
exactly and literally mean a promise to pay, or desiring quick payment m order to
tide over some financial strait, or simply working with a commendable view to
pleasing his master by a show of promptitude, he insisted on dragging the immediate
payment of this money into the question of the cable ship s operations, and refused
to allow the ship to begin until the Sudan Government s promise had been received.
6. Such an ultimatum had to be opposed and Sheikh \ussef brought to realise
that highway methods are not always successful. I assured him that I would
personally do my best to secure a speedy payment of the sums legally due, but refused
to be party to an indecorous attempt to make the Sudan Government (who were,
meanwhile, unconscious of Sheikh Yussef’s pistol-play), put up their hands by a
given date. This was not sufficient. An appeal was therefore made to the
Emir Feisal, who agreed at once that, so soon after the agreement had been signed,
the Sudan Government would hardly expect that the c: Mirror ” would be delayed
like a hostage in Jeddah Harbour. Sheikh Yussef’s manoeuvre collapsed forthwith;
and when I met him soon after the ship had commenced operations, he seemed almost
glad that it had. , .
7. There is something of the knave and something of the tactician in Sheikh
Yussef Yassin. But it would probably be wrong to condemn him altogether. He has
not yet really had his chance. When he gets it, or rather, when he reaches the
security he is at present striving hard for, he may develop into a less irritating
negotiator, and show less fear of, and therefore less hostility to, the outside world.
A little tolerance would greatly improve his tenacity and soften his lean and hungry
nature.
8. Mention has been made in recent reports of the Syrian influence in Mecca.
(See, for example, paragraphs 11-13 of the report for October 1926.) Such influence
undoubtedly exists, and might under circumstances favourable to itself, conceivably
develop into an important factor in ibn Saud’s policy, a bias tending to direct his
thoughts in the direction of Syria, Palestine and Trans-Jordan. Sheikh lusset
Yassin speaks in the bitterest terms of the Emir Abdullah. On the other hand,
there are considerations automatically redressing the bias. In the first place,
although Ibn Saud cannot help but be influenced by the persons who supply him with
advice and information, the King’s policy remains strongly a personal one. that
policy must at the present time be chiefly concerned with internal affairs and with
affairs touching Asir and the Yemen.
9. In the second place, the Syrian influence, only partial as it is, has in the
Hejaz itself enemies whose exasperation has been increased by the prominence into
which Sheikh Yussef Yassin has sprung since the King’s absence. One night, some
time ago, there appeared on the walls of the post office in Mecca a large notice asking
why Syrians should rule the Hejaz and why Hejaz money should be drained to Neja.
The notice contained a warning to the Syrians to wrap their throats up well before
going to bed. The chief of police has scoured Mecca by night in disguise in searc
of the authors of this manifesto, but neither he nor his agents have been successlu.
The threatened Syrian Vespers has not materialised, and is unlikely to do so. uj
fact, on the King’s return, the importance of this melodramatic episode wi
disappear along with the deflated prestige of the persons menaced. ,
10. It is, however, clear that the Syrians are unloved and resented,
discontent is felt at the distribution in Nejd of gold drawn from the Hejaz.
in February Ibn Saud had the considerable sum of £50,000 sent urgently to Kiya ^
from the Hejaz treasury, and it was widely known that the money would be spew
in the entertainment and subsidy of the Hejdian chieftains. . ,
11. Ibn Saud has been devoting himself to the affairs of these old ass ^ cia ,
of his while he has been in Riyadh. A certain discontent among them was reliec
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