ملف ١٩٢٤/١٧٠٧ "الجزيره العربية - تقارير عن الوضع في جدة. (١٩٢٤-١٩٣٠)" [و‎‎٣‎٤] (٨٩٨/٧٢)

orders for the punishment of raiders on his side and the return of loot. He said
that he had taken suitable, though not public, action in regard to Ibn Musaad, the
Governor of Hail, whose February performance he disapproved of and regretted,
although he would not admit that they constituted a raid in the ordinary sense. He
admitted that he had not done anything to carry out article 3 of the Hadda Agree-
imyit by placing his local authorities in direct touch with those on the Transjordan
sic He had held back because he had had no confidence, but he now^ hoped to make
the necessary arrangements for direct contact at an early date.
9. Meanwhile, protests regarding raids continue to be made. On the 2nd and
6th June Fuad Hamza weighed in with two lists of no less than twenty-seven raids
on various dates from November 1928 to the 27th May, 1930.
10. A question has been pending for some time regarding the disposal of two
parties of Druses, now in Nejd, whose leaders are Sultan Pasha El Atrash and
Mahmoud-el-Halabi. These people are at a place called Nebk in inconvenient
proximity to the portion of Transjordan adjoining Syria. It has been variously
suggested during the last year that they might be settled in Southern Transjordan,
that Ibn Sand might be moved to shift them further into the interior of Hejaz-Nejd,
or that advantage might be taken of an offer to King Feisal to let them settle in Iraq.
The last of these proposals held the field in June, and if may be unnecessary to
pursue the idea of approaching Ibn Saud. No direct information is available
regarding the attitude of the latter. The Druses themselves stated, towards the end
of last year, that he had given them an ultimatum either to move into the interior or
to leave his dominions. The Italian review “ Oriente Moderno ” for May talks of
the probable conclusion of an extradition treaty between the mandatory Power in
Syria and the Hejaz-Nejd Government and the possible connexion between this and
a report that Sultan Pasha El Atrash had been warned to leave his present habitat.
The “Oriente Moderno” goes on to describe various alleged efforts by Syrians,
Palestinians and Egyptians to get Ibn Saud to cancel the warning.
11. On the 9th June the Hejaz Government addressed to Sir Andrew Ryan
a memorandum protesting strongly against the proceedings of a Transjordan officer,
Abdulla Errihan, who was said to have presented himself at Qariat on the 5th May
and tried to bluff the authorities there into letting him proceed to Jauf by pretending
his journey was authorised by Ibn Saud. A telegram from Jerusalem dated the
24th June shows that the officer in question has more than once been employed for
purposes of communication or attempted communication with the authorities in Nejd.
Action in Jedda was delayed pending the receipt of further information from
Sir John Chancellor. . . .
12. At his audience of the King on the 11th June, His Majesty’s Minister
carried out his instructions (see May report, paragraph 5) to confirm officially y hat
he had said as from himself regarding Ibn Sand’s refusal to sign the Bon-Voisinage
Agreement with Iraq pending the negotiation of an extradition treaty, with any
additions suggested by Sir Francis Humphrys. The communication in its official
form fell under three heads, viz. :—
(1) The great disappointment experienced by His Majesty’s Government in
common with the Iraq Government and Sir Francis Humphrys.
(2) The utility of the agreement, independently of any other merits, as an
instrument embodying that recognition of Ibn Saud by King Fersai to
which the latter had consented under pressure from Sir Francis
Humphrys.
(3) The difficulty, amounting at present to impossibility oi agreeing on an
extradition treaty the negotiation of which might be expected to break
down over disputes regarding “ political ofienders apart Horn any
other points.
13, Ibn Saud again insisted that a Bon- Voistnage Agreement without an extra-
tion treaty would be valueless and impossible of honest observance. Subject to
tat he was" anxious, he said, to fall in with the views Ox His Majesty s Goveimnc
id’would sign the Bon-V oisinage Agreement, if they really wished him to do so.
ir Andrew Ryan did not take this as a formal assurance but prefei-red to press the
ing no further without up-to-date information from the Iraq end. It was qu
ear that the Ibn Mashhur affair was sticking hardest m the hong s gwa*d ; ^
ndrew Ryan held out a certain hope that it would be disposed of m the near future
his hone'is strengthened by later information from Bagdad which points to a leal
eslre onlhe part of King /eisal to get Ibn Mashhur back into Neid, provided they
in both be assured that the promise of pardon given on ooard the Ll 1
[166 ff—1] B