ملف ٣٤٤٣\ ١٩١٤ الجزء ٣ "الحرب الألمانية: أفغانستان وبلاد فارس؛ العملاء الألمان؛ القوات البريطانية في شرق بلاد فارس" [و‎‎٦‎٧] (٣٤٥/١٤٤)

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State Telegram, No. 68-F., dated the 31st December 1915.
p rom —His Britannic Majesty’s Minister, Tehran,
To—His Britannic Majesty’s Consul for Sistan and Kain, Sistan.
Russian Legation are anxious to see Shaukat replaced by Hisam-ud-Daulah.
and I should be glad to have your views as to the advisability of the change.
Would there be any advantage in the appointment of the latter to Kainat and
leaving the former in Sistan or would it be possible to send an outsider ?
Telegram No. 1, dated the 4th January 1916.
From—His Britannic Majesty’s Consul for Sistan and Kain, Sistan.
To—His Britannic Majesty’s Minister, Tehran.
Your telegram of the 31st December No. 68-F. As I do not know the general
policy of His Majesty’s Government in regard to Persia in view of recent events
from which it appears that but for active armed intervention of Russians we would
have lost our hold completely over the country, I find it difficult to answer the
first half of your telegram.
If the Anglo-Russian Convention is about to be abrogated and our commercial
competition with Russia in these parts is no longer to be supported there may
be no harm in appointing to Kainat a (virtual) Russian protege who became
notorious in 1910 for his cmfo-British policy . while he governed Sistan. Two
years ago also Russian Vice-Consul did his utmost to dissuade and save
Hisam-ud-Daulah from going to Tehran.
I do not believe that we can ever trust Hisam-ud-Daulah. The one and only
advantage to be gained in renewing friendly relations with him is that he is closely
related to the Baluchis and has influence in Sarhad. He has not so much influence as
Shaukat in Birjand.
If we are still to compete with Russia commercially your suggestion that Gov
ernorships of Kainat and Sistan should be separated seems to be disastrously
retrograde.
We have only just succeeded in getting these districts removed from the
obstructive supervision of a Governor-General in the Russian sphere. If the new
Provincial Government is now abolished the two districts will doubtless be re
incorporated in Khorasan.
Shaukat cannot be ‘ lefr ’ in Sistan because he has never visited this district
except once for three months last winter. He has always posed as the champion
of Kainat against Sistani and Sarhadi Baluchis. He did little here but fine and
imprison Sistanis found in possession of camels, etc., looted from Kainat, and he was
all the time in fear of being assassinated. He brought all the Birjand troops with
him. The present arrangement with Sartip Muharmr ad Reza as Deputy Governor
of Sistan is not unsatisfactory. Shaukat would never accept the Governorship of
Sistan only as his position would be untenable with Hisam at Birjand. Nor would
it be satisfactory to make Hisam Governor of Sistan and under Shaukat as Gover
nor-General, unless such proposal comes from latter himself.
It will be difficult to introduce an outsider because all the present troops are
natives of Kainat and retainers of Shaukat.
In my opinion Shaukat ought to be given a fair chance of proving his loyalty
and obedience to the Persian Government under the new regime. I must emphasise
that they have not yet given either Governor or Karguzar orders to co-operate with
us against Germans. His attitude hitherto has been that, knowing the instability
of the Cabinet and his own comparative powerlessness, he dared not make the
Germans his enemies so long as he was not sure that they would not eventually gain
the upper hand. I think that most other Governors (including Kerman) have
followed the same policy, and we should not blame them for it.
The Russians for f r ur years past have been inimical to Shaukat (except in the
time of Colonel Vygornitzky). The original reason w as that he enlisted our support
*, . " against them, tide telegram No. 39,* dated
oreign LepartmerA. 27th j u } v ig ]2 from this Consulate.