ملف ١٩٢٣/٤٠١١ الجزء ٢ "الخليج الفارسي: مفاوضات ١٩٢٨ هنجام" [و‎‎٦‎٠] (١٩٣٤/١٢٤)

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to a length of 140 feet. Coal and oil supplies are also available there. The
Royal Indian Marine Dockyard at Bombay (which has the disadvantage of
being over 500 miles further from the Persian Gulf) is capable of providing all
the docking and refitting facilities which the Persian warships could require,
and from a social point of view might prove attractive to the Italian officers and
personnel employed on board the Persian ships. The Royal Indian Marine
would be prepared to permit the use of the Bombay yard by Persian warships
within the limits imposed by their own needs.
9. With regard to the suggestion in your telegram No. 18, Saving, of the
30th May, that His Majesty’s Government might also offer to provide the Persian
Government with a dock on favourable terms, it would be of more advantage
if the Persian Government could be brought to depend entirely on facilities at
Karachi or Bombay, and that they should not be encouraged to provide facilities
of their own. In any case, I would deprecate an offer to provide a dock being
made spontaneously, or, indeed, at all. If the question is raised, I suggest that
you endeavour to persuade Teymourtache that, if he takes advantage of our
offer of facilities at Karachi or Bombay, the expense involved in building a
dock in Persia would be rendered unnecessary.
10. In discussing with Teymourtache the possibility of providing the
foregoing facilities in India, you will emphasise not only the relative nearness
to the Persian Gulf of India, as compared with any other country capable of
affording similar facilities, but also the additional expense and delay which
would be involved by the use of the Suez Canal. You will appreciate, however,
that great eagerness in making the offer might give the undesirable impression
that His Majesty’s Government desired for general political reasons to attract
the new Persian navy into the orbit of their influence. For this reason you wull
no doubt consider it preferable that the offer should, in the first place, be put
forward merely as a tentative suggestion which His Majesty’s Government, if
the Persian Government should so desire, might possibly be prepared to consider.
11. The preceding paragraphs of this despatch were drafted before the
receipt of your telegram No. 127 of the 8th September, and I had proposed to
suggest to you that you might feel it preferable to postpone further discussion
of the Hen jam issue in the hope that the treaty negotiations in general might
meanwhile take a more favourable turn. The present instructions may still be
of assistance to you, however, in the discussions which now appear imminent
on this issue, which constitutes by far the most important single item in the
negotiations.
I am, &c.
JOHN SIMON.
Enclosure 1 in No. 1.
Extract from Draft Instructions sent unofficially to Mr. Hoare on May 3, 1932.
AS you are aware, the main question of interest to His Majesty’s Govern
ment is now that of the naval station at Plenjam. I have considered the
suggestion made in paragraph 7 of your despatch that an attempt might be
made to secure the requisite facilities at Hen jam by some kind of informal
arrangement allowing for the continued use of Henjam by the British squadron
for recreational purposes during the hot weather. But this solution would not
be satisfactory from the point of view of the Admiralty, and would present a
number of serious drawbacks. I recognise, however, that, in view of the
weakness of the position of His Majesty’s Government at Henjam, it may, in
the last resort, be necessary to fall back on a solution on these lines. The matter
is, however, one of such importance to His Majesty’s Government from the naval
point of view that they are anxious that a further attempt should, if possible,
be made to obtain a settlement of the question on lines approximating more
closely to those originally proposed, and it occurs to me that, if the complication
-caused by the question of the air route can be cleared out of the way, the
situation may become more favourable, and it may then still prove possible to
hold the Persian Government to their former attitude.
Unless, therefore, you see serious objection, I shall be glad if, in your next
-conversation on this subject with the Minister of Court, you will explain that