مجموعة ٢١٦/٣٠ "تطوير موارد النفط في الشرق الأوسط." [و‎‎٥‎١] (١٣١/١٠٢)

extensions already agreed upon 0 If approved "by
the Board discussion would have to take place with
the United States Authorities regarding the necessary
priorities for provision of equipment. It was
highly desirable that an early start should he made,
due to the swampy nature of some of the ground over
which pipe-lines would have to he laid#
(ii) Iraq/Haifa P i pe~line » The chief factor here was the
reopening of tlie lleaitarraneasu This made it possible
to ship crude oil from Bast to West as was probably
necessary 0 In this connection it had recently been
suggested that the Bari refinery might take some
Haifa crude 0 Certain denial schemes had been put
into effect in Iraq, but redrilling could take place
without difficulty. The potential supply from Iraq
was very large#
(iii) Qatar# This v/as not yet a complete scheme in that
no refinery v/as at present available for products
from this area, but it would be some time before there
v/as a substantial output from this field# Very
considerable reserves, which had been proved,
existed there#
MR. STARLING- said that the Petroleum Division thought
all three schemes were good and practicable, and it was a
matter of urgency to lay them before the P.A.W# for
consideration with other world-wide schemes. Some of the
pipe-line requirements could be supplied from the United
Kingdom.
REAR ADMIRAL PEG-RAM said that the Admiralty strongly
supported all three schemes# As regards the needs for the
war in the Pacific, although supply from Middle Eastern sources
was possible, he did not think at this stage in the war it
was very -oracticable due to the extremely long haul over a
dangerous"route, but Indian Ocean requirements would be heavy.
MR# STARLING- mentioned that some oil from the Middle
East resources was already Tbeing supplied to Australia.
REAR ADMIRAL PEGRAM concurred, but said that requirements
for the war in the Pacific would be extremely high.
MR# HEARN pointed out that the first scheme (Abadan
extension) would not mature until 1945 By which time it might
be hoped the strategic situation would be very different, and
thus enable supplies to be made over a wider aroa.
REAR ADMIRAL PEGRAM ’said that the scheme for the
increased supply of crude to Abadan involved the temporary
immobilisation of the port of Bandar Mashur as a secondary
^ for the supOy of fuel pumped from Abadan. 1?^"
+> ... vl „„ am o'mt irrrr'ortance of the major plan, the .admiralty
the CHAIRMAK Askea the Petroleum Division to look
finrefully into this point.