تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [ظ‎‎٢‎٣‎٢] (٤٧٣/٤٦٧)

any negation of the principles of independence. In normal times it would be
employed on ordinary police duties with special reference to foreigners, while in
time of emergency it would be particularly charged with the protection of foreigners
and their property, and would at the same time furnish a trained body ol men,
untouched by local political influences, on which the Government could rely to
assist in the general maintenance of public order.
(It would, of course, have to be clearly laid down that this force could not be
used for any political purpose whatsoever.)
From the British point of view His Majesty’s Government would be relieved
of a military commitment and a large item of expenditure which otherwise bids fair
to remain at something very near its present figure for a considerable time to come.
Such British troops as are considered necessary to keep in the area could be stationed
in some convenient locality in the Suez Canal neighbourhood or the Sinai Peninsula,
and so serve as a central reserve available either for Palestine or Egypt.
In regard to negotiations now being carried on in London, it is not improbable
that the removal of the main stumbling-block might enable a permanent agreement
to be arrived at, or at least ensure the^ acceptance by Egypt of a modus virendi on
the lines suggested by Sir William Hay ter in his memorandum.
The above suggestion is made on the assumption that it is vital to reduce
military expenditure and commitments, and therefore to come to an agreement with
Egypt. Failing an agreement, a modus rivendi, as outlined by Sir William Hayter,
put into force by proclamation of His Majesty, offers probably the best chance of
a really satisfactory solution, but it is absolutely dependent on the retention in
Egypt for an indefinite time of the existing British garrison.
^ 1 G. F. CLAYTON.
October 8, 1921.