تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [و‎‎٢‎٣‎٢] (٤٧٣/٤٦٦)

3
The protection of Egypt against external foes does not appear to be any reason
for the maintenance of a British force in Egypt itself. Egypt has the Soudan on
the south and Palestine on the north-east, both of which countries are under British
control and therefore present no menace. Any attack by the Senussi, unsupported
by Italy, on the western frontier could probably be met by Egypt from her own
resources supplemented by a small measure of British assistance, which could be
easily and rapidly furnished.
Any serious attack on Egypt, therefore, must come from a European Power
if it comes at all, would presumably mean that Great Britain was at war with that
Power, and would be preceded by a diplomatic situation during the existence of
which preparations for war on a large scale would be pushed forward. A few
battalions stationed in Egypt in such circumstances would probably not affect the
situation one way or the other, especially as Egypt would be our active ally being
primarily affected.
The protection of our Imperial communications presumably means in the first
place the protection of the Suez Canal, with perhaps as minor desiderata the
keeping open of an alternative land-route to the East via Alexandria and Port
Soudan and the maintenance of direct communications by rail and river with the
Soudan and Uganda,
It is hardly conceivable that any Egyptian Government would ever by itself
challenge the world by attempting to interfere by force with the traffic through the
Suez Canal, or, if it were so mad as to do so, would have the slightest chance of
success against British naval action. The Egypt! an army is small, and even its present
efficiency will be much impaired by the withdrawal of most of the British officers.
Financial considerations are bound for many years to prevent any sensible increase
in the Egyptian army, even if an Egyptian Government were so bold as to extend
the scope of the already intensely unpopular recruiting law. Moreover, any
serious augmentation of numbers would take time and would doubtless be made the
subject of diplomatic protest by His Majesty’s Government, backed up. if need be,
by a show of force.
Any real threat against the Suez Canal, therefore, will come from outside
Egypt, and will mean war with some great Power, and consequently immediate
naval and military dispositions for the protection of Imperial communications, of
which the Suez Canal is perhaps the most vital.
Again, it is not easy to see how the presence of a relatively small permanent
garrison in the interior of Egypt would greatly affect the issues; indeed, the fact of
its presence, which would mean a potentially hostile, instead of a probably friendly,
Egypt, might well add to our embarrassments by necessitating the maintenance of
a military occupation of the country.
There remains the question of the protection of foreigners in Egypt.
It may be assumed as most improbable that any Egyptian Government would
.expose itself t<^ the measures on the part of the European Powers which the
adoption of an anti-foreign policy would entail, and it may be considered as
practically certain that its efforts would be directed towards the safeguarding of
all legitimate foreign interests, partly with a view to giving evidence to the world
of its capacity to govern, and partly in order to avoid the foreign intervention
which would certainly follow any failure in this respect.
The only real fear, therefore, is the inability^ of the Egyptian authorities to
maintain order, or such an internal political situation as might threaten the
stability of the Government itself. In such an event disturbances might occur in
the course of which the lower classes might get beyond control, with grave danger to
the life and property of the foreign communities, unless some reliable force were
available for their protection.
It is suggested that the need for such a force—at present furnished by the
British army—might be met by an undertaking on the part of the Egyptian
Government to maintain an adequate corps of British constables under British
officers.
A force of this nature, properly trained and organised, would serve the purposes
of public security even more effectively than does the British army, in that it would
be speciallv trained for the duties it might be called upon to perform, and would
intervene in the earliest stages of trouble instead of being withheld until the
situation had become really serious and the trouble widespread.
From the Egyptian point of view, the force, though European, would be under
the control and direction of the Egyptian Government, and would not, therefore, be