تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [و‎‎٢‎٣‎١] (٤٧٣/٤٦٤)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.]
No. 1.—SECRETARY OF STATE.
EGYPT AND SOUDAN. [October 19.]
CONFIDENTIAL. Section 1.
[E 11503/260/16] No. 1.
Mr. Scott to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 19.)
(No. 882.)
My Lord, Ramleh, October 10. 1921.
I HAVE the honour to enclose for your Lordship's consideration an interesting
memorandum on the question of the political settlement with Egypt which 1 have
received from Sir Gilbert Clayton, adviser to the Ministry of the Interior.
Sir Gilbert Clayton expresses his agreement with the views set out by
Sir William Hayter in the memorandum, of which a copy was enclosed in
Lord Allenby's despatch No. 530 of the 27th June last, but he goes rather further,
and, assuming that the general"financial situation of Great Britain imperatively
demands a reduction of her military expenditure and commitments in Egypt,
discusses the possibility of an agreement with Egypt by which this reduction might
be effected without imperilling the vital interests of hier Imperial communications,
while at the same time affording reasonable guarantees for the protection of
foreigners and the maintenance of public order in the country. Sir Gilbert Clayton
suggests, in effect, that the two latter objects might be secured by assigning to a
special body of British police constables the duties which, in the last resort, would
fall upon the British troops.
There can. I think, be no question that any settlement, or even a modus
vivendi, which was not arrived at by agreement with the Egyptians and therefore
required to be imposed by British authority, could only be enforced by the continued
occupation of the country by British troops.
Whatever Adly Pasha’s attitude might be in face of such a contingency, it
would be strenuously and persistently resisted by Zaghlul Pasha and the
extremists. As your Lordship is aware. Zaghlul Pasha has recently renewed his
campaign for “complete independence"' and. while making every allowance for
his ability in canvassing and stage management and for the loss ne has sustained
by the defection of many of his more intellectual supporters, the power which his
eloquence and personality still exercise upon the masses is admitted to be great.
It is therefore a matter for reflection whether, under pressure for economy at
home and in the face of unremitting agitation in this country, the policy of
maintaining British troops in Egypt in any form which would imply military
occupation could be successfully upheld. It is asserted, and I do not for a moment
question the truth of the’ statement, that the mere presence of British troops acts
as a powerful deterrent upon would-be disturbers of public order, and there are
doubtless countless people in Egypt who would regret to see them go, but the idea
of independence, whether it is understood or not, has so taken a hold upon the
public mind of the country that it is at least arguable whether their presence
cannot be manipulated by the skill of the professional agitator to create just the
unrest which it is designed to allay.
I may remind your Lordship that the influence exercised by the army of
occupation has of late years been closely bound up with the powers wielded by the
Commander-in-chief under martial law. On the termination of martial law, the
power to take administrative measures which are not within the compass of
Egyptian law will lapse and. in the position of greater freedom and responsibility
in which the Egyptian Government will be placed, there will inevitably be more
reluctance than there is now to utilise the troops for maintaining public order.
It seems probable that in practice they would only be called in to quelTdisturbances
of a widespread character involving grave danger to Europeans. It would be the
natural duty of a body of British police constables to prevent such a situation
arising.
From conversations which I have had from time to time with the representatives
of foreign Powers here, I am impressed with the confidence, apparently generally
felt among the foreign communities, in the benevolent intentions of Egyptian higher
officials towards them. Their chief fear is that of ill-treatment bn the part of the
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