تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [و‎‎٢‎٣‎٠] (٤٧٣/٤٦٢)

[This Document is the Property oi Hig Britannic Majesty’s Government,]
CONFIDENTIAL.
COPY OF A LETTER FROM MR. SELBY. FIRST SECRETARY AT
BRITISH RESIDENCY, EGYPT, TO SIR WILLIAM TYRRELL.
My dear Willie, October 1, 1921.
ALTHOUGH I know you must be overwhelmed with many questions of graver
importance than the particular issue with which I happen to be concerned, I do not
hesitate to write to you my views of the present situation, since I am anxious that
at the present juncture, when a settlement of the Egyptian problem for better or for
worse may be in sight, no considerations should be overlooked.
I dare say you will remember I have frequently expressed misgivings as regards
the view that we could achieve our aims in Egypt with the willing consent of public
opinion in the country. There has seemed to me too wide a divergence between the
two points of view. If we must insist on such limitations of real independence as
the maintenance of troops in the country, control of foreign affairs and other items
in the hitherto accepted programme of His Majesty’s Government, I have felt that
the settlement must in the ultimate resort be one imposed by Great Britain, and that
they must accordingly be prepared to pay the requisite price for bowing before her
imperial requirements. 1 hear some talk of prospects being fairly bright at the
present moment as between Adly Pasha and His Majesty’s Government. I cannot
estimate what this exactly means. If, however, as I assume, it indicates a disposition
on the part of Adly Pasha to concede the claims of His Majesty’s Government on
the main issues—from the papers I have seen I have no reason to suppose His
Majesty’s Government as at present advised have any intention of giving way on
those issues—it dees not alter my conclusion on the situation as a whole. Adly
Pasha could not, in my humble opinion, secure acceptance of an agreement in Egypt
which involved considerable concessions on the Zaghlul programme, without our
complete and effective support for some time to come. The means which would be
required to carry Adly Pasha through would not be very much less than those we
should require if we had to impose a settlement of our own dictated from London.
Zaghlul and the ideas which he represents are still too all-pervading for that.
Are His Majesty’s Government prepared to provide the means for carrying
through the policy which insistence on their present major reservations entails? On
the answer to this question should, in my humble opinion, depend the attitude taken
up towards Adly Pasha when the negotiations are resumed. If it is in the
affirmative, there is none who will be better pleased than I shall be. I have an
intense reluctance to giving up what we hold. On the other hand, it is futile and
dangerous to commit oneself to a line of action which altered circumstances make
impossible of realisation.
What are the means required to maintain such limitations of the Zaghlul
programme, to which Adlv Pasha has himself committed himself out of fear of
Zaghlul, as maintenance of garrisons in Egypt, &c., involves?
Firstly, I consider that Lord Allenby should be assured the garrison in Egypt
as it exists to-day is secured to him for some time to come, and that, so far as
expenditure on the maintenance of troops in Egypt is concerned, Irish and other
complications &nd budgetary considerations have already been determined for next
year at least. At the present moment I understand that General Congreve, who is
commanding the troops here, is satisfied he could deal with troubles on any foresee
able scale. It is true that if we had a repetition of anything like what occurred in
1919, all his time would be taken up in dealing with the situation in the towns for
two or three weeks, and that the country would have to wait. Still, he could get
through without much danger of catastrophe. It is perhaps useful to notice in
passing that even now we could not in certain eventualities protect the lives and
property of foreigners in remote districts. They would be left, till mobile columns
could be formed, to such protection as the Egyptian police might provide. The point
is not without interest in relation to our claim we must keep troops to protect
foreigners.
Shrewd observers of the present position do not anticipate a repetition of the
events of 1919. They may be right, but we should not take too many risks, since
547—3 [7i52b]
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