تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [و‎‎٢‎٢‎٩] (٤٧٣/٤٦٠)

[Thii Document is Uie Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Goiernment. ]
CONFIDENTIAL.
COPY OF A LETTER FROM MR. SCOTT, BRITISH ACTING HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR EGYPT, TO MR. LINDSAY.
My dear Lindsay, Ramleh, September 30, 1921.
THE local situation has developed rapidly in the course of this week—I have
described the process fully in my telegrams, and for the moment have nothing to
add on that score.
I take it that we are bound to continue negotiations with Adly until we either
succeed or fail. You know better than I do what chance there is of succeeding, and
meanwhile there is not very much that we can do at this end to help towards success.
But 1 felt that Zaghlul’s propaganda, which I do not believe he would or could have
opened again without the Labour members’ moral support, was cutting the ground
under the feet of Adly and his Government, rendering much less probable the chance
of Adly agreeing to a settlement which there was a reasonable prospect of the
country accepting and possibly even leading him to throw up the sponge on his
return to London. 1 therefore supported the Council of Ministers’ request that
these proceedings of Zaghlul should be stopped by martial law, the only means we
have of stopping them.
Amos, who had been in Cairo for a few days, came in this evening and I showed
him the telegram to you giving Sarwat's statement and my comments. He was
rather horrified, and feared that the course I proposed might lead to the deporta
tion again of Zaghlul and company and to incalculable measures of repression. He
seems to think that the possibility of winning Zaghlul over by money or some other
means is not excluded. Clayton does not believe in this possibility, nor do I. Sirry
Pasha, who has known Zaghlul for many years, told me yesterday that Zaghlul
would not be contented eVen with the Premiership, and that we shall never have
peace in this country as long as Zaghlul is here, and Sirry is not a man of strong-
political leanings. ] may be wrong, but I do not think that we may necessarily be
forced to deport Zaghlul.
But the events of the last three years show pretty clearly the truth of
Roosevelt’s advice of twenty years ago : “ Either govern or get out.” As a result
of two years’ talk and attempt at compromise, we are in a worse position as regards
the terms we are likely to get than we were at the start, and if we talk for another
year we shall be worse off still and may even eventually be fired out, bag and baggage,
with nothing to the credit side.
We are now face to face with the choice of one of two courses: (1) To make up
our minds what concessions we can make, lay down our policy and enforce it. I
mentioned in may telegram that there was reason to believe that, even if Adly failed
to get his terms accepted in London, he and his present colleagues would continue
to be on the side of law and order. I asked Sarwat if I might telegraph this and
he agreed. It is worth something to us, though how much is difficult to predict.
(2) To agree to complete internal independence and withdraw our troops to the
canal.
As regards (1), I understand there are only two points now on which there is
okely to be serious difficulty with Adly : (< 7 ) Foreign affairs; {b) question of troops.
Foreign affairs seems to me relatively unimportant. Question of troops is more
difficult. But if we retain them in Cairo, Alexandria, &c., we must be prepared for
I chronic restlessness in the country, we must have sufficient troops to prevent that
| restlessness from breaking out into disorder, and we must be assured that no ques
tions of financial stringency or political difficulties in Ireland or elsewhere shall at
any time be allowed to reduce the number of troops in Egypt deemed by the military
authorities to be adequate for our purpose. All this suggests a policy of repression *
and it is likely that such a policy will be necessary, but it would have to be faced
; and carried on as long as the circumstances required it, regardless of criticism from
anywhere. ( an His Majesty s Government guarantee us the troops and the monev
\ t0 pay them • if’ n °c I believe it would be tetter to go for (2) and have done with it.
547—2 [7152 a]
V
73 “