تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [ظ‎‎٢‎١‎٧] (٤٧٣/٤٣٧)

o
the advice formally tended on behalf of His Majesty's Government by the Britiwi
representative, or else resign. Apart from that, the High Commissioner will lit
able to take his own measures, with the assistance of the British army, for tin!
protection of British or foreign interests, if the Egyptian Government is unable
or unwilling to take effective action. Legislation will not be applicable to foreigners *
unless approved by him. In matters of finance, the Egyptian Minister will always
have the report of the financial commissioner hanging over his head; and Ministers,
who will naturally wish to establish in the eyes of the world their capacity for sound
financial administration, will think twice before they risk an unfavourable report,
which would be most damaging both to their immediate credit and to their ultimate
political aspirations.
20 . Many of the specific proposals made above may, and probably will, need
amendment, if any scheme of the kind outlined is to be adopted; I have purposely
left the proposals as to the duties of the judicial commissioner vague, because
Mr. Amos is far more capable than I am of defining them. But there are some
propositions which, I am convinced, are essential as the foundation of any practical
scheme. They are as follows :—
(a.) No Egyptian Minister can fairly be asked to sign a treaty fixing the
permanent status of Egypt at anything short of complete independence,
ff he does, he will be accused of signing away the liberties of his
country, will lose all political backing, and will very probably be
assassinated. When Boutros Pasha was murdered, Wardani gave as
his first reason for the crime the fact that Boutros had signed the
Convention of 1899, giving to Great Britain a share in the Government
of the Soudan. Saroit Pasha conducted the examination, as procureur
general; it is not likely that Ministers have forgotten the facts.
Probably, Adly Pasha knows perfectly well that, if he signed anything
at all like the treaty foreshadowed iii Lord Milner’s report, he would
be signing his own death warrant.
(b.) The British army in Egypt must be available for the protection of the
lives and property of the foreign colonies and of British interests in
general, at the discretion of the High Commissioner.
(c.) Control must be centralised in the hands of the High Commissioner, and
not distributed among a number of commissions and commissioners.
(d.) Any settlement effected must be a viodus vivendi, adopted for a limited
time.
21 . It is quite possible that Egyptian Ministers would not be prepared to sign
even a treaty establishing a temporary modus vivendi. They ought, I think, to be
given the chance; but if they refuse, a scheme on the general lines set out above
could be put into force by proclamation of His Majesty, and would, I believe, be
very generally accepted as satisfactory. I think that there is no doubt that the
great majority of Egyptians would be glad of a solution.
Whichever way the scheme is put into force, it should be made clear that we
recognise the fact that the Egyptian claim is one for complete independence, and
that the modus vivendi established is not in any way to prejudice the consideration
of that claim as soon as the ten years’ period has elapsed.
22 . I wish to say, in conclusion, that I do not regard the proposal for a
temporary modus vivendi as mere camouflage intended to cover a permanent settle
ment. I think it quite probable that in ten years’ time international arrangements
will have been made which will make the world a much safer place for defenceless
nations, and will provide efficient safeguard for international lines of communica
tion. I also think it quite likely that Egyptian Ministers and officials, given a
definite task to perform and a free hand to deal with it, will do better than even their
best friends now expect. The last few years have been for them a time of great
difficulty and perplexity; but when the main political question is settled,^and
Ministers have an obvious and straightforward policy to follow, I personally believe
that they will do well. I also believe that they will find no lack of able and energetic
assistants among Egyptians of the younger generation. I think it likely that, after
ten years of trial under favourable conditions, the claims of Egypt for complete
independence would have to be very seriously considered.
June 5, 1921.
W. G. HAYTER,