تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [و‎‎٢‎١‎٧] (٤٧٣/٤٣٦)

*
i
5
With regard to this last category, it appears that the Powers might reasonably
be asked ^o make this delegation, in view of the measures proposed for the protection
of their nationals in Egypt. The delegation would only be temporary, so that their
ultimate rights under the Capitulations would be in no way affected. It would not
be necessary to wait until all had adhered to this arrangement; every adhesion
would lessen ino tanto the difficulty of getting legislation through.
16. The result would be that, during the period of the modus vivendi, the High
Commissioner and his officers, with the support of the army of occupation, would
be entrusted with certain specified and definite powers for the protection of British
and foreign interests; and that, subject to the exercise of those powers, the
Egyptian Government would be free to govern as it thinks best. I can see no reason
why we should prescribe constitutional monarchy and ministerial responsibility as
the form of Government; it seems to me a matter for Egyptians to decide. Educa
tion, justice (except as regards foreigners), public security, public works, provincial
administration would be entirely in the hands of Egyptian Ministers, so would
finance, subject to an outside audit, and to some control over the budget; so .would
the Egyptian army. The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be
re-established, and I see no reason why Egypt should not have diplomatic representa
tives in foreign capitals.
17. As to the British officials, I think the scheme proposed by the Milner
Commission is a fair one, but I have the gravest doubts whether it could be carried
out without serious dislocation if the policy of the commission is adopted as a whole.
In that event, a Nationalist Ministry would be chiefly concerned in cutting the
Administration loose from the Residency, and.no better means could be adopted
than the wholesale dismissal of British officials. Under the proposed modus vivendi,
on the other hand, British officials of the Egyptian Government would have nothing
to do with the Residency, while the Egyptian Government would have an obvious
interest in securing the highest possible efficiency in administration. If they could
show, at the end of the ten years’ period, that the British forces had never had to
turn out for the protection of foreigners, that the financial and judicial commis
sioners had had no serious fault to find with the administration of finance and
justice, and that the country was peaceful, prosperous and well-governed, they
would be able to approach His Majesty’s Government and the Powers with a very
strong case for complete independence. It is therefore to be supposed that they
would utilise that period for the formation of a really strong and efficient native
administration, for which purpose the assistance of the British officials, during
at least the first few years, is clearly indispensable. But I suggest that, while the
Egyptian Government should always be free to replace an Englishman by an
Egyptian, an Englishman should not be replaced by another foreigner, except with
the express consent of the High Commissioner. There is a real danger of the
introduction of foreign officials for political purposes.
18. The plan of judicial re-organisation, generally known as the Hurst scheme,
has had the unhappy fate of meeting with universal opposition. I have yet to meet
one friend of the scheme, English, foreign or Egyptian. Mr. Amos has done his
utmost to keep the project alive, and has, I believe, drafted some four or five editions
in succession in a loyal attempt to disarm opposition, but all his efforts have been
quite fruitless. Foreign residents in Egypt are looking with concern and apprehen
sion at their probable future in this country; it is the worst possible time to deprive
them of their accustomed safeguards. It does not help matters to offer them other
safeguards in exchange, alleged to be just as good; they do not believe it. The
British colony is at least as much opposed to this scheme as any other. Even if the
scheme were more acceptable, [ should still postpone its application for the present.
I am convinced that we should do well to ask the Powers to renew the Mixed Courts
for another five years, with the sole condition that we should have a much greater
liberty in the choice of judges than at present. In this respect, I suggest that each
Power should be entitled to one representative, and that subject to that we should
have a free hand. I should leave the Consular Tribunals as they stand until much
quieter" times.
19. It may be asked how the High Commissioner is To enforce his views in
those matters left to his control. I see no reason why Ixmd Granville's despatch,
which is the foundation of the British control in Egypt, should not be considered
as remaining in force. By that despatch Egyptian Ministers were informed that,
so long as the British army of occupation remains in Egypt, they must fall in with