تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [و‎‎٢‎٠‎٨] (٤٧٣/٤١٨)

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It is hardly necessary for me to remind your Lordship of the disabilities under
which the Egyptian administrative machine has been working for the last two years
The system which has prevailed since the occupation is admittedly of a somewhat
illogical character, justifiable chiefly by the fact that for many purposes it proved
effective in operation. With the growth of a new class ol native officials, not lacking
either in ability, administrative experience or ambition, a system which depended
theoretically on advice was already beginning to wear somewhat thin before the war,
and the question of the propriety of adopting some definition and limitation of the
responsibilities of His Majesty’s Government was beginning to be raised. . The events
of the last two years have brought this question into the utmost prominence, without,
however, providing a settlement. The consequent underlying sense of uncertainty
as to the present responsibilities and future powers and influence of the British
authorities constitutes a serious obstacle to the administrative progress. A statement
of our view of our responsibilities appears to be a necessity, however tempting it may
appear, should an impasse be reached in our present political policy, to allow the
present modus viuendi to continue.
I have, &c.
ALLENBY, F.M., High Commissioner.
Enclosure 1 in No. 1.
Memorandum by Mr. Amos.
THERE are several circumstances in the present political situation which
justify serious apprehensions as to the prospects of a policy based upon Lord Milner’s
report being eventually carried through to a successful conclusion.
2. The principal adverse influences consist in the currents of hostile opinion in
England and in the possibility of dissensions between rival parties in Egypt. The
fact that the scheme implies the abolition of the Capitulations increases the
complexity of the position.
3. The prospects of success may be improved if the consequences of failure are
carefully explored.
4 . These consequences will differ to some extent according to the causes to which
failure is due, or is commonly attributed. If the failure is obviously due to factious
dissensions in Egypt, it seems not unlikely that effective political opinion in Egypt
will form itself into two camps : the one will be composed of all those elements which
now support Adly Pasha and who are satisfied that His Majesty’s Government has
gone as far as it can be expected to go; the other will be composed of the out-and-out
supporters of Zaghlul Pasha, with possible support from Mohammed Pasha Said.
5 . The former group is chiefly composed of the land-holding and official classes
and the more educated and older members of the professions. The latter is composed,
I imagine, chiefly of the Azharians, the students and the younger and less reflective
members of the bar and the other professions.
6 . All the different elements of these two groups have their ramifying influence
on the great masses of the people. I believe the statement frequently made that the
latter are not interested in politics to be exaggerated. There are, I suppose, few
fellaheen who have not some relative or acquaintance in the Azhar, the Government
service, or some other one of the politically active groups mentioned above; and any
strong sentiments or infectious formulae entertained or professed by the middle and
upper classes tend to find their echo in the villages through the mechanism of the
newspapers, the preaching in mosques, correspondence and conversation.
7. It is improbable that the majority of Egyptians desire to be governed by Saad
. Zaghlul Pasha, with or without the assistance of Mohammed Pasha Said. If these
two succeed in making the conclusion of a reasonable agreement impossible, and
$ affairs are so conducted that they are obviously responsible for the failure, I am
disposed to think that there would be support in the country for an arrangement on
the following lines, to be promulgated as the decision of His Majesty's Government.
8 . — (a.) The abolition of the protectorate.
(b.) The Constitution of 1913 to be put in force again; the advice of His
Majesty’s Government as to the constitution of Ministries to continue to
be authoritative, the Sultan to cease to preside over the council; the
functions of the financial adviser to remain unchanged.