تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [ظ‎‎٢‎٠‎٧] (٤٧٣/٤١٧)

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memoranda. I have on many occasions emphasised to your Lordship that the
memorandum published in Egypt in August last has come to be regarded, whatever
the real intentions of His Majesty’s Government, as a substantive oiler; and that any
wide departure from the main principles of the settlement which that memorandum
advocated would be regarded as a breach of faith, not only in Egypt itself, but by
world opinion at large.
While holding the view that His Majesty's Government are bound to tacilitate
on their side a settlement in the manner indicated, I do not wish to suggest that His
Majesty’s Government have not gone as far as they could be expected to go in the
direction of furnishing a basis for discussion with the official Egyptian delegation.
The concession as regards the protectorate announced in your Lordship's telegram
No. 119 is a liberal and generous one, and it is difficult to see what further conces
sions His Majesty’s Government could be expected to make in advance of the official
negotiations. It is certain they could not agree to accept in advance the reservations
of Zaghlul Pasha. Some of them involve the interests of the foreign communities
in Egypt, which His Majesty's Government are bound to safeguard, and any specific
limitation at this stage of the powers to be attributed to the financial and judicial
advisers, without regard to the settlement as a whole, would be difficult, not to say
impossible. Lord Milner's report does not preclude the discussion of Zaghlul
Pasha's reservations, but London is the place for such discussion.
Mr. Amos deals with this aspect of the question, and seems to be of opinion that
if the basis of discussion suggested by His Majesty’s Government is now rejected by
the Egyptians, His Majesty’s Government would have a clear and strong case for
the policy they have pursued. As regards world opinion, a factor not to be
disregarded, rfis Majesty's Government could show they had made every concession
that was reasonably possible to give effect to their undertakings, while, in the matter
of Egypt itself, Mr. Amos seems to think that some support would be forthcoming
for a policy, the initiation of which would inevitably devolve upon His Majesty’s
Government, if owing to the adoption of an unreasonable attitude on the part of
the Egyptians there were to be a breakdown in the negotiations for the formation
of an official Egyptian delegation.
The policy advocated by Mr. Amos in such an eventuality is as follows : —
(a.) The abolition of the protectorate.
(b.) The Constitution of 1913 to be put in force again; the advice of His
Majesty’s Government as to the constitution of ministries to continue
to be authoritative; the Sultan to cease to preside over the council; the
functions of the financial adviser to remain unchanged.
(c.) An Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs to be appointed; diplomatic
representation, subject to proviso that Egyptian policy shall not conflict
with British.
(d.) The army of occupation of course to remain and martial law to be abolished .
as soon as an Indemnity Act, applicable both to Egyptians and to
foreigners, can be passed, either by resorting to the consent of the Powers
ad hoc, or. if they can be brought into force, under the operation of the
draft judicature laws. It would be a matter for consideration whether
the abolition of martial law should also be made conditional upon the
promulgation and bringing into effect, with the necessary consents, of
these last-mentioned laws. This might be found somewhat difficult to
justify.
(e.) A special regime for foreign officials in the Egyptian Government to be
established; provision to be made to regulate more closely the number of
posts available for foreigners.
With some significant modifications these proposals are in accord with the spirit
of the policy advocated by Lord Milner. The reforms would, however, have to be put
into effect, temporarily at least, without that consent on the Egyptian side which
Loid Milnei lias hitherto legarded as a fundamental requirement. In this connection
it is to be noted that without a sufficient measure of agreement on the part of the
Egyptian Government so much of this plan as rests upon the promulgation of
Egyptian legislation of a novel kind might prove difficult of execution.
The main requirement is that His Majesty’s Government should be prepared
for eventualities and be ready with an alternative policy which could be announced
without further delay if present plans miscarry. That policy must accord in its
main essentials with the spirit of the settlement aimed at by Lord Milner.