تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [ظ‎‎١‎٩‎٨] (٤٧٣/٣٩٩)

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Milner proposals, viz., that the responsibility of the Council of Ministers to the
Legislative Assembly would, in his opinion and that of many leading Egyptian
politicians, be at present a dangerous experiment, leading to intrigue. But he
repeatedly insisted that “ it would be impossible for him to nominate an official
delegation until His Majesty’s (Government come to a definite decision which would
form a basis for discussion.”
This, then, is the point at which we have arrived. If we mean to keep our pledge
as to the delegation (and it is unthinkable that we should not), if we want to settle the
Egyptian question peaceably and to escape a revival of controversy and agitation very
likely in a much more dangerous form, we cannot procrastinate indefinitely, or wait
till the Dominion Premiers arrive in June to help us to make up our minds, but must
come to some prefatory decision without delay. What form should it take ?
Lord Allenby, whose official telegrams, as well as his private correspondence,
demonstrate that his views are substantially identical with those which I have more
than once placed before the Cabinet, has supplied us with a formula (17th January).
It is that we should forthwith make the following declaration to the Sultan :—
“ His Majesty’s Government, after a study of the proposals made by Lord
Milner, have arrived at the conclusion that the status of protectorate is not a
satisfactory relation in which Egypt should continue to stand to Great Britain.
While they have not reached final decisions with regard to Lord Milner’s
recommendations, they desire to confer regarding them with an official delegation,
nominated by the Sultan with a view, if possible, to substitute for the protectorate
a treaty of alliance wdiich would, while securing the special interests of Great
Britain and enabling her to offer adequate guarantees to foreign Powers, meet the
legitimate aspirations of Egypt and the Egyptian people.”
I am not wedded to these precise words. But they represent in substance the
two principles which, while sharply criticising some of Lord Milner's proposals, I
asked the Cabinet to accept in my note of the 1st January, viz., (a) the substitution of
a treaty of alliance for the existing but disputed protectorate, and ( 6 ) the recognition
within certain defined limits of the independence of Egypt.
If we are prepared to go as far as Lord Allenby proposes,’then I believe, and
Lord Allenby concurs with me, that when the delegation comes here we shall be able
to exact pretty well what terms we desire about the disputed points, and even to insist
upon the control of foreign relations. We shall also be able to take up a firm line
about the Zaghlul reservations, which of course we shall be willing to discuss pari passu
with the discussion by the Egyptians of our objections, but about which I hope that
w 7 e shall decline to give way. In other words we should have made our maximum
concession, and if we did not obtain the terms that we desired would then revert to
the status quo ante. If we do not adopt some such line, but take refuge in further
delay, we shall be acting in direct opposition to the emphatic and repeated advice of
the Sultan, of Lord Allenby, of Lord Milner, and indeed of everyone 1 have met or
heard from who is acquainted with the present position in Egypt; we shall obtain no
delegation; Adly and Mazloum, who is to be president of the delegation, will decline to
serve upon it (vide Lord Allenby’s telegram of 19th January), and we shall be back in
the quicksands. It is too late now to act as though Lord Milner had never existed, or
as though his report had not been written, or was not about to be given to the world.
As a matter of fact the Egyptians are giving us a great opportunity by the super
stitious and almost insane significance which they attach to the phrase protectorate.
In their eyes it connotes servitude of a degrading character, inconsistent with the
gloiious Wilsonian discovery of self-determination as the future guiding principle of
mankind. Why should we not humour them ? Why worry about the rind if we can
obtain the fruit ? I take it that what we all have in view is that Egypt would remain
inside rather than outside the British Imperial system. If the best way to do this is to
drop the word protectorate and conclude a treaty of alliance with her, as we did with
the Indian Princes a century ago (their relation to us has indeed been commonly
defined by the constitutional writers as one of “ subordinate alliance ”), why not do it ?
My advice therefore is :— *
1 . That we should now make up our minds to go as far as Lord Allenby proposes,
and invite the Sultan to appoint and send the delegation on that basis.
2. That we should have an early discussion in Parliament. Indeed, we cannot
escape it—at which we should, without committing ourselves to any
acceptance in detail, lay down the above general propositions, and invite
opinions as to detail.