تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [و‎‎١‎٩‎٤] (٤٧٣/٣٩٠)

39
through the mediation of Great Britain, and Great Britain could only expect to
succeed in inducing the Powers to part with their present privileges, if she were in a
position to assure them that solvency would be maintained and that the lives and
property of foreigners would be secure. Our efforts were accordingly directed to
securing for Great Britain such a position as would enable her to give this necessary
assurance. In order to achieve this object, it is necessary that any Treaty should
provide for the right of Great Britain intervene in legislation affecting foreigners
and to exercise a certain measure of control over those branches of the administra
tion which most directly affect foreign interests.
Subject to these safeguards for the special interests of Great Britain and the
protection of foreign rights, we hold that the Government of Egypt should be restored
in fact to what it has always, during our occupation, been in theory, a Government
of Egypt by Egyptians. We have sufficient faith in the reforming work of the last
forty years to believe that such a course can now be followed with a good prospect of
success. But it must be adopted wholeheartedly and in a spirit of hopefulness and
sympathy. Nothing would be more likely to lead to failure than to overload this
policy with an excessive number of timorous restrictions, which would obscure the
principle of Egyptian independence, create suspicion as to our real intentions, and
defeat our main object—the re-establishment of mutual goodwill and hearty
co-operation between British and Egyptians.
We make no attempt to conceal our conviction that Egypt is not yet in a position
to dispense with British assistance in her internal administration. But the
Egyptians know this, and when once the responsibility is clearly theirs, they will be %
slow to dispense with such help from us as is essential to the prosperity and good
government of their country. They will be all the slower to do so, because under
this system it will be impossible to attribute any failure that may occur to British
dictation, and because the good work of British officials in the future will redound to
the credit of the Ministers who are wise enough to retain them. Moreover, the whole
atmosphere will, in our opinion, be completely changed when the Egyptians are
satisfied that the purpose of British policy is to help them to realise their ideal of
independence and not to stand in the way of its attainment. We are greatly fortified
in that belief by our own experience in dealing with the representative Egyptians
with whom we have come into such intimate contact. Once convinced of the
sincerity of our intentions they showed every readiness to appreciate our point of
view, to recognise the special interests which Great Britain has in Egypt, the debt of
gratitude due to her for her past work in that country, and the indispensability of her
future help in maintaining its integrity and independence. And we are not
discouraged by the fact that they were not all as yet prepared to commit themselves
unreservedly to every point in the settlement which they had collaborated with us in
devising. We make no doubt that they are wholeheartedly in favour of the main
features of the settlement and that they are anxious to secure its acceptance by their
countrymen. And, as far as we can judge, public opinion in Egypt is moving
decisively in that direction. There is a sensible diminution of the bitter feeling
and violent propaganda which were recently so prevalent, and the country is anxious
to settle down. The moment is favourable for placing the relations of Great Britain
and Egypt on the satisfactory and enduring basis of a Treaty, which will at one and
the same time establish the independence of Egypt and secure the essential interests
of Great Britain. It will be an undoubted advantage to Great Britain to have
those interests carefully defined and placed beyond challenge in a Treaty accepted by
the Egyptians, as it will obviously be an advantage to Egypt to have her integrity
and independence guaranteed by Great Britain. We therefore strongly advise His
Majesty’s Government to enter without undue delay into negotiations with the
Egyptian Government for the conclusion of a Treaty on the lines which we have
ventured to recommend. It would, in our opinion, be a great misfortune if the
present opportunity were lost.
We desire in conclusion to record our thanks to the two Secretaries of the Mission
and to express our appreciation of their invaluable services.
Mr. A. T. Loyd, the senior of the two, had, after many years’ experience in
Egypt and in the Foreign Office, retired from the Public Service shortly before the
Mission began its labours. But, yielding to the earnest request of our Chairman, he
agreed to accompany us to Egypt and to act as our principal Secretary there, though