تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [و‎‎١‎٣‎٨] (٤٧٣/٢٧٧)

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the relations of Egypt with the outside world.
(4) The two principal points of difficulty are the
concession of foreign relations and the military control.
Under the scheme of the Milner Hission, Egypt will be repre
sented by accredited envoys in foreign countries and the
foreign countries will have their accredited envoys in Cairo.
The Egyptian Ministers abroad will be charged with the duty
of looking after the interests of Egyptian traders and
travellers and of negotiating arrangements which will have
to be submitted to us fo' approval and then presumably
rend stored bv the League of Nations. So long as Great
Britain has the right of controlling the treaty-making
power I can see only good in this proposal. Let us assume
that we refuse such a concession to the Egyptians, do we
in any way diminish the opportunities for intrigue open
to Egypt in foreign capitals, or the opportunities for
Intrigue open to foreign Powers in Cairo? X do rot think
so. Intrigues will go on whether or not the intriguers
are duly accredited, hut it is reasonable to suppose that if
the spirit of Egyptian nationalism can be enlisted on behalf
of the British Empire instead of against it, our diplomatic
position in foreign capitals will be so much the easier.
(5) It is admitted that Egypt is vital to the security
of our military communications with the East. It is a
thousand times more valuable to us than Mesopotamia or
Persia. Lord Milner seems to have been successful in
securing the assent of Egyptian nationalism to the proposi
tion that we imist take precautions for securing our
military position in Egypt. On the other Land, it is
part of the agreement that there is to bo no Army of
Occupation. This raises a difficulty, for Lord Allenby
gave it as his opinion that if there were to be troops
anywhere in Egypt, that they should bo placed in Cairo,