تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [و‎‎١‎١‎٦] (٤٧٣/٢٣٣)

ocument is tne Proi>erty of flis Bmamuc Majesty s Gavermnent]
l Printed for the use of the Cabinet. September 1920.
SECTRET.
THE CABINET.
THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSALS.
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
I AM not in the least surprised by the criticisms of the Secretary of State for War
in 0.P.-1803. Indeed, the wonder is that such criticisms have not been more
numerous. I was quite prepared for an outcry in the press. But, contrary to
my expectation, even the “ Jingo ” press has taken the suggestion of Egyptian
“ independence ” very quietly. 1 have seen a great deal of favourable comment—some of
it certainly from people whose approval makes me wince—and very little comment that
was distinctly unfavourable. I have, however, had a few disapproving private letters.
One of these, conceived “ rather in sorrow than in anger,” is from an anonymous
correspondent, who concludes with the words : “ I fear, my Lord, you are getting old.”
This is unfortunately true. But I think that even in my hey-day I should have
regarded the proposed concessions to Egyptian Nationalism as just and politic, and as
calculated to strengthen and not to weaken our Imperial position.
On the face of them, it is true, the proposals look like a step backward. And in a
sense they really are a step backward, but to a more secure position than that which we
now occupy. In itself the acknowledgment of Egyptian “ independence ” is nothing new.
We have declared, not once but scores of times during the last forty years, that we had
no intention of appropriating Egypt. Mr. Churchill, indeed, regards Egypt as having
been “ definitely incorporated in the British Empire.” 1 doubt whether that is correct.
Presumably he is referring to our proclamation of a protectorate over Egypt in 1914.
The proclamation of a protectorate over a foreign country may mean much or little,
but it is certainly not equivalent to annexation. Moreover, at the very time when we
proclaimed the protectorate we went out of our way to represent our action as intended
to defend Egypt against dangers threatening her independence ! And we at the same
time raised the status of the ruler of Egypt from that of “ Khedive,” the vassal of
Turkey, to that of “ Sultan,” the title of his former “ overlord ” ! Whatever may have
been the effect of these curious and somewhat contradictory acts and declarations,
which have been very differently interpreted by us and the Egyptians, it is certainly
difficult to contend that they constituted an incorporation of Egypt in the British
Empire.
My own conviction is that it is totally impossible for any human being, however
ingenious, to make out what the political status of Egypt at the present moment
actually is. The object of the proposals now under discussion is to define that status
for the future, and at the same time to give to such rights as Great Britain may
hereafter possess in Egypt an unquestionable legal basis in the deliberate consent of
the Egyptian people. These rights are to be conferred upon Great Britain by a Treaty
made with the Sultan of Egypt and confirmed by a National Assembly.
At present we are in fact absolute masters of Egypt. But every act of authority
which we exercise is liable to be challenged, and is in fact challenged, by Egyptian
public opinion as a usurpation of powers to which we have no right. We are, in the eyes
of the Egyptians, their riders de facto, but not de jure. This will, in my opinion,
prove in the long run to be an intolerable position. Sooner or later, and the sooner the
better, we must settle the question of the status of Egypt and of our own position in
that country, and there are only two ways of really settling it. One is to annex Egypt
and thus definitely “ incorporate it in the British Empire.” The other is to gratify
the constant and ever-increasing desire of the Egyptians to be recognised as an
independent nation—a desire which we have done so much to encourage—and to make
the best bargain we can with them on that basis.
If we can make a sufficiently good bargain, the latter course has enormous
advantages. That we can maintain our position in Egypt in the teeth of Egyptian
opposition, is in my opinion not doubtful. But we shall have to pay a very heavy
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