تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [و‎‎٧‎٠] (٤٧٣/١٣٩)

importance to representation on tiie League of Nations and
on International Conferences on all questions, technical or
otherwise. This was one of the reasons for the insertion
of the provision under discussion.
The trend of the discussion v/as in the direction that
some alternative must be found to our present position in
Egypt, the maintenance of which required the presence of e
large military force, and this even though, as foreshadowed
by the Secretary of State for War, considerable reductions
in the present force of 15,0CC to 16,0C0 men might prove
practicable. The question for consideration was whether
Lcrd Milner^ proposed alternative was the best possible.
This led to considerable discussion on the military
aspects, and the question was asked as to how the size of
the garrison would compare on the alternative assumptions --
(i) that the present state of affairs continued,
and
(ii) that the proposals of Lord Milner’s Commis
sion were adopted and received only a mod
erate degree of general acceptance by the
Egyptian people.
Field-Marshal Lord Allenby stated that, under the Com
mission’s proposals, the British forces at Ismalia (where
Lord Milner suggested they would be stationed) would be at
the Egyoticns since their water-Ruoply would be at the mercy of
the mercy of/Cairr,which must be considered the heart of
Egypt from a military point of view. He laid great stress,
therefore, on the maintenance of a Lritish fores in Cairo.
If no British troops were kept there, he felt certain that
foreign nations, including the Americans, would probably
insist on the provision of Legation Guards. Otherwise,
the High Commissioner and ether Europeans in Cairo would be
at the mercy of any seditious movement.
Questioned as to his views on the scheme as a whole,
Lord Allenby (who was due to leave for Egypt on the following
day) stated that he did not like the manner in which negotiation