تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [ظ‎‎٢‎٣] (٤٧٣/٤٦)

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from my colleagues that I view this proposal with considerable anxiety, and that I
would greatly prefer any arrangement that would offer greater safeguards for the
future.
The situation must be looked at (a) in its external and (b) in its internal aspect.
(a.)* There will, as .contemplated in Lord Milner’s first Report, be an Egyptian
Minister or High Commissioner with an Egyptian Legation in London (to be followed
presently, I suppose, by an Afghan Legation, an Arab Legation, and I dare say a good
many more); and there will be Egyptian Ministers at the majority of the foreign
capitals. Their good faith and loyalty to the British connection are to be maintained
by the stipulation that “ Egypt will undertake not to adopt in foreign countries an
attitude which is inconsistent with the Alliance or will create difficulties for Great
Britain, and will also undertake not to enter into any agreement with a foreign Power
which is prejudicial to British interests.” This language, particularly the first
sentence, is very vague, and within its ambit it is not difficult to conceive of intrigues
at Paris and Rome which might be very prejudicial to British interests. To anyone
familiar either with the history of French diplomacy towards Egypt or with the/
present tortuous proceedings of Italian policy in the East, it will not be difficult to
imagine conditions which would hover continually on the line between good faith and
bad faiths and might cause us much trouble. The only answer given to me is that we
must trust, and that if the Egyptian Government had unofficial instead of official
representatives at foreign capitals they would probably intrigue much more.
(6.) I confess that I view with greater anxiety the possible position at Cairo. In
190-1 Lord Lansdowne, by his agreement with the French, purchased the French
acceptance of our superior position in Egypt by a corresponding recognition of the
French Protectorate and abandonment of our own claims in Morocco. France retains
and is daily extending and consolidating the position thus conceded to her in Morocco,
and is making it an excuse for being exceedingly disagreeable to us both about the
Egyptian clauses of the Turkish Treaty, to which her assent is required, and about
Tangier. Are we perhaps paving the way by which she may redeem the, as she thinks,
disastrous error that she committed in Egypt when she abdicated her share in the
condominium over thirty years ago, and are we creating the opportunity for one more
source of discord between her and Great Britain? The Anglo-Persian Agreement,
which conceded to Great Britain in Persia a position somewhat analogous to that
which it is proposed that we should occupy in Egypt, has not prevented France from
intriguing against us, and putting every conceivable obstacle in our path at Tehran.
In Egypt she already retains the great advantages of the French language, French
judges and judicial procedure, and French schools. She will be dealing there in
future with an independent, sovereign State. May she not be tempted at times of
friction or strained relations to use the first opportunity provided for her of twisting
the Lion’s tail? May she not even revive her dreams of a North African sphere of Q
French influence from the Atlantic Ocean to the Suez Canal/ Even if the Quai d’Orsay
be innocent of any such deliberate intention, may not extreme nationalist elements in
Egypt, which will not be suppressed by the proposed treaty, but will probably gather
fresh strength as time goes on, intrigue with the French in Egypt as their most
natural anti-British ally ? So long as we were both the protecting and the occupying
Power in Egypt we could deal sharply with such pretensions. We shall in future lack
the local power, while not escaping the responsibility.
The only guarantee that 1 can think of, supposing Lord Milner’s proposals to be
accepted, for rendering the position less dangerous than it might otherwise become, is
a categorical undertaking that the Egyptian Government shall not appoint foreign
officials to any branch—or at least any important branch—of the Administration without
the consent of the High Commissioner. It may be said that, once the British
Protectorate has disappeared, our relations with the Egyptian Government will be so
cordial that no danger of foreign intrigue will survive, and that they will regard us as
a natural buffer against the meddlesomeness of other foreign Powers. This is an ^ v . /
excellent theory. But I have too much experience of the zest with which -aoutral^U-vvpux
Governments fish in troubled waters, atotl, if there is the slightest chance of extracting
some profit from the operation, to be at all confident that it will always be acted upon.
The British Services.
I am in general agreement with Lord Milner’s proposals as to future
appointments to the Egyptian service and as to the retirement, whether voluntary or
compulsory, of the present British staff. 1 do not doubt that the Egyptian Govern-
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