تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [ظ‎‎٢‎١] (٤٧٣/٤٢)

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to introduce certain modifications, this will, I think, be generally recognised as falling
within, not merely our powers, but our duty. Nor can I believe that even the general
considerations, to which Lord Milner has given such powerful expression in his reply
to Mr. Churchill, and with the spirit of which I entirely concur, need commit us to an
unqualified acceptance of his scheme, or debar the Egyptians themselves from accepting
such changes as, after a full discussion with them, we may decide to insist upon. It
is from this point of view that 1 submit the following comments.
Nature of the Proposals.
Broadly speaking, Lord Milner proposes to convert Egypt from a British
Protectorate into an independent Sovereign State, ruled by a constitutional sovereign,
a representative Assembly, and an Egyptian Ministry responsible to that Assembly.
The executive will be Egyptian, assisted in an advisory or subordinate capacity by
such British officials as the Egyptian Government may decide to employ or retain.
The police and the army will"be, with an important exception to be named presently,
Egyptian forces, and the maintenance of law and order will be an exclusively
Egyptian responsibility. There will be an Egyptian Foreign Office, with an Egyptian
Foreign Minister at Cairo and Egyptian diplomatic representatives in London and in
other capitals. The Egyptian Government will be able to pass such legislation and
to take such administrative action as it pleases, subject to a certain power of
supervision by the British High Commissioner in cases affecting foreigners. The
two British advisers, Financial and Judicial, upon whom it is proposed to insist, will
be merely advisers; and already an attempt is being made by the Nationalist party in
Egypt still further to emphasise their subordination. Taxation will be in the hands
of the native Government, provided that they do not discriminate against foreigners.
They will be able to conclude commercial or other treaties. The whole of these
conditions are to be laid down in a treaty concluded between Great Britain and
EsypL ......
On the other hand, the reality or the relics of British authority in Egypt—
whichever it be—are to be demonstrated by the following arrangements :—
There is to be a British High Commissioner in Egypt who “ will be accorded an
exceptional position and will be entitled to precedence over all other representatives. ,,
He is to have the right to intervene in cases where foreigners are likely to be
unfavourably affected by Egyptian legislation. These are the sole powers specifically
mentioned in the memorandum. There is to be a British military force in Egypt, but
it is not to be a garrison, and its numbers and location are to be determined by
imperial as distinct from local considerations. In times of war Egypt is to render
such military assistance to Great Britain as may be within her means. Abroad she is
to undertake “ not to adopt in foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with
the alliance or will create difficulties for Great Britain, and not to enter into any agree
ment with a foreign Power which is prejudicial to British interests^*
Military Position,
I will first examine the military position. The strength of the British military
force is not stated, and is left to be determined. The Egyptians will probably seek to
define its numbers. Lord Milner is, I believe, hopeful that a total strength of something
between 3,000-5,000 will suffice. On the other hand the treaty is to fix the place
(not places) where it shall be quartered. Lord Milner has in mind some locality
contiguous to the Canal, and in any case on its western side, probably in the neighbour
hood of Ismailia. Now let us see what functions this army is to perform. It is
intended primarily “for the protection of Imperial communications,” he., first and
foremost the Canal, but also, I imagine, such railroads, harbours, and aerodromes as are
a part of the scheme of necessary Imperial communications. This does not appear to
be made sufficiently clear in the memorandum, which speaks of these resources as only
being available to the British “ in case of war”—a limitation which is probably not
intended.
Secondly, Great Britain is to “ undertake to support Egypt in defending the
integrity of her territory.” Now Egyptian territory may be attacked either by sea, in
which case the British Navy will ex hypothesi proceed to her defence, or by land ;
and land attacks maybe delivered from any of three quarters: (i) the Senoussi on
the west; (ii) Bedouins, Arabs, or Syrians on the east and south-east; (iii)—but less