تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [و‎‎٢‎١] (٤٧٣/٤١)

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[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Ma jesty s G ov ernment.]
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Printed for the Cabinet. October 1920.
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for FoRErox Affairs.
THE decision at which His Majesty’s Government must arrive upon Lord Milner’s
proposals is one of the most momentous that will ever have been taken by a British
Government, not only in its effect on Egypt itself, but in its reaction on every country
in the East towards which we act in a governing, or fiduciary, or mandatory capacity.
For what is given to Egypt, over which we have solemnly declared our Protectorate
scarcely six years ago, can with difficulty be withheld from other countries, whose
national spirit is equally clamant and assertive. We are therefore not merely solving
a difficulty, but creating a precedent. The Cabinet have already had a memorandum
from the Secretary of State for War, expressing grave alarm at the proposals, and a
general reply from Lord Milner. They will desire to hear the Foreign Office point of
view, which has not been arrived at except after a prolonged discussion of the case with
Lord Milner and Lord Allenby.
Position of the Case*
In May last there was circulated to the Cabinet a letter from Lord Milner to me
forwarding the general conclusions arrived at by his Mission at the end of their sojourn
in Egypt. In this letter a full Report was promised at a later date, but has not been
received.
Towards the end of August, just as Parliament was separating, Lord Milner sent
to the Foreign Office a further memorandum reporting the results of his conversations
with Zaghloul Pasha, Adly Pasha, and other prominent Egyptians, w r ho had been
invited to London to assist in the deliberations of the Mission. This memorandum
contained the outlines ol a complete scheme for establishing the independence of
Egypt by means of a Treaty of Alliance and for surrendering the British Protectorate,
while retaining a certain position of predominance or superior influence for Great
Britain. The scheme had been prepared quite independently of the Foreign Office,
but it represented, I understood, the unanimous views of Lord Milner and his colleagues,
and it had the support of the Egyptian politicians above mentioned, who were prepared
to return to Egypt and to advocate it there. The scheme had not, of course, the
authority of His Majesty’s Government. Had not the Cabinet already adjourned, I
should have at once arranged for its submission to my colleagues. As it was, the
utmost that could be done, as Lord Milner pressed for its transmission to Cairo, in
order to prevent erroneous versions from getting abroad, was to inform the British
representative there that the proposals had nqt been considered by the British
Government, but were sent not for publication but for his information, and that of the
Sultan and his Ministers. As a matter of fact, the Nationalist party did not hesitate to
introduce into their version of the scheme features which formed no part of it.
Nevertheless, the scheme in its broad outlines has been received in Egypt by the
members of the old Legislative Assembly and by Nationalist opinion in general with
a good deal of satisfaction, and there seems every reason to suppose that, if it be
endorsed by His Majesty’s Government, it will be in the long run accepted in Egypt.
This, indeed, is not surprising, considering the large and ample concessions that have
been made to native sentiment, which can hardly have expected so substantial a
victory. How far the final decision of His Majesty’s Government has been prejudiced
or compromised by these events it is difficult precisely to say. No doubt the
Nationalist party in Egypt will already have invested the scheme prepared by such
high authority with an almost sacrosanct character, and will resent or resist any
substantial modification of its terms. Due weight must be attached to this considera
tion. But it cannot be allowed to prevent us from examining minutely the proposals
themselves, both individually and collectively ; and if, in the interests either of Great
Britain in Egypt or of the British Empire, His Majesty’s Government find it necessary
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