تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [ظ‎‎١‎٨] (٤٧٣/٣٦)

4
It is unquestionably a bold experiment to leave them to devise their own
constitution and run the country themselves with so few restrictions as are contemplated
under the proposed arrangement. The experiment may well be a failure, but it is not
so certain to be a failure as any half-measures would be. For, with any limited
system of self-government, we should have the whole body of Egyptian “ Nationalists ”
—that is to say, practically all the educated and semi-educated natives—united not to
try and work the new institutions, but to make them unworkable, with the object of
getting something more.
Even if our more liberal plan is adopted, there will, at any rate at the outset, be a
party clamouring for still larger concessions and wishing to get rid of us altogether.
But as against these extremists we shall have, as indeed I believe we already have,
the saner elements of Egyptian “ Nationalism ” on our side. The next few weeks, or
months, will show whether these saner elements are also the stronger. If they are,
the great experiment can be tried with good hope of success. If they are not, the
experiment will not be made. Certainly I should be the last to recommend it.
When I speak of the saner elements of Egyptian Nationalism I am thinking of
those influential men—and I believe they are the majority—who are perfectly well
aware that Egypt cannot get on without British help, that a large number of the
present British officials are indispensable to the administration of the country, and
that Egypt cannot hope to retain the services of these men except on fairly
lucrative and entirely honourable terms. They may think the number of British officials
excessive, as indeed it is, and they resent having them imposed upon them, whether
they feel that they want them or not. They desire that the British officials should be
really, as they always have been nominally, Egyptian civil servants, not the masters
of their nominal chiefs. In my own opinion—I may be quite wrong, but that has been
the dominant consideration in my mind—we have now reached a stage, at which
British influence in the conduct of the administration will be strengthened, and not
weakened, if we frankly accept this position. On no other condition will cordial
co-operation between British and native officials be possible in future. The present
system means constantly-increasing friction. But once remove the main cause of that
friction—the feeling of the Egyptians that the British are there as their masters—and
I believe that native Ministers will continue to lean—often, indeed, to lean too heavily—
upon the British members of their staffs. It is true that the latter will no longer be in
a position to dictate, but will have to rely upon their personal qualities to carry the
day by influence and persuasion. But that is how the best of them have always
worked in the past. The Egyptians are, as a rule, very quick to recognise ability in
men of any foreign race which they respect, and ready to be guided by it, especially if
it is combined with tact and good manners.
If we had only to consider ourselves and the Egyptians, I should have very little
anxiety about the settlement now proposed. I believe it could be effected with
comparative ease, that it would be to the advantage of both parties and that it
would work, not indeed perfectly, but much better than the present system. The
blessed word “independence” will get us round many awkward corners just as the unfor
tunate word “ Protectorate ” would make even Paradise unattractive to the Egyptians.
The difficulties that I foresee lie in a different direction, i.e., the attitude of the
Foreign Powers- twelve in number—who have Capitulatory Rights in Egypt. It is
essential to the success of the proposed settlement that we should be in a position to
exclude foreign interference in the internal affairs of Egypt. On the other hand, there
are great and permanent foreign interests in that country which we are bound to
recognise, and the inevitable necessity of providing safeguards for those interests, of
guaranteeing to the European communities the same security of life and property as
they enjoy to-day, will always involve some infringement of the “ complete indepen
dence ” of Egypt. What we must be prepared for is that the foreign Powers
specially interested in Egypt may be alarmed, or pretend to be alarmed, at the degree
of “independence” which we propose to accord, and on that ground may refuse to
abandon the rights which they now have under the Capitulations. But unless these
foreign Powers will abandon those rights, it is impossible for us to relax our control,
for in that case we should not really be helping Egypt on the road to “ independence,”
but, on the contrary, be giving her a number of masters instead of one. this would
be reactionary from the Egyptian point of view and fatal to our own position.
Therefore it is essential that we should be able to show that, under the proposed new
system, all legitimate foreign interests will be as safe as they are to-day.
As a matter of fact, the proposed arrangements do safeguard all legitimate
foreign interests, though it does not follow that all the foreign Powers concerned will