أوراق عن السياسة البريطانية والحركة العربية [ظ‎‎١‎٦‎١] (٣٨٠/٣٢٦)

to leave no doubt that, whatever happens in these territories, Great Britain cannot
allow any other Power to acquire predominant rights there.
(xii.) Kurdistan.
It would be almost equally safe to rely here too upon the choice of the inhabitants,
though it might also be well to point out that the country is bound up with
Mesopotamia geographically and economically, and could not lead a satisfactory
existence if dissociated from it.
(xiii.) Syria.
It will be advisable to draw a distinction between the Lebanon (within the old
boundaries of the autonomous vilayet, with the inclusion of the Beirut enclave) and
the remainer of the Syrian area.
It is understood that Sherif Feisal and the non-Lebanese Syrian Arabs are willing
that the Lebanon should maintain its separate existence, unless, or until, it desires to
merge itself in the larger Syrian body politic, and that it should receive assistance from
France, so long as it is clearly established that the French are invited by the free choice
of the Lebanese. Considerable opposition to the paramountcy of French influence at
Beirut may, however, be offered by the United States, since the Presbyterian College
at Beirut is one of the most important American missionary institutions in the Middle
East, and it would be in danger of being throttled by the rival Jesuit Mission under
a French or francophil regime. British interests, on the other hand, would not suffer
appreciably by the acceptance of French assistance in the Lebanon, and we can safely
maintain an impartial attitude in case of disagreement between France and America.
It will be all the more important not to thwart French aspirations in the Lebanon
if we intend, as regards the remainder of Syria, to pursue the policy suggested in
Section I above.
It is understood that the Syrians are determined to assert their right of self-
determination and free choice of assistance, that they have no intention of asking for
the assistance of France, and that their choice will almost certainly fall upon Great
Britain. We, on our part, have simply to affirm the general principle, and to allow
the local application to work itself out. But since in Syria, unlike Anatolia, the
result may not merely be to the disadvantage of an Ally, but also, in all probability,
to our ovvn advantage, it is particularly desirable that in this case our action should
be so indisputably loyal and correct as to leave no ground for permanent French ill-
feeling.
It may be best, therefore, to be perfectly frank with the French Government, '
ami to tell them beforehand that we insist upon the Syrians exercising a genuinely free
choice, and that we shall do nothing on our part to bias their decision, but that we
think it not impossible that they will opt for us, and that, if they do, we intend to
accept the invitation.
(xiv.) Palestine.
The problem of Palestine cannot be solved entirely on the principles of self-
determination and free choice of assistance. As in Armenia, there will be a mixed
population, and there will be one element in that population, in this case the Jewish
colonists, which, for special reasons, will be entitled to a position more than mathe
matically proportionate to its numbers at the start.
Moreover, in Palestine there are international religious interests so important
and so difficult to reconcile, that they almost overshadow the internal problems of the
native inhabitants. r
For these reasons, the desires of the inhabitants, or of the several sections of them
will have, to some extent, to take the second place. The assisting Power will be bound
to act not merely as their mandatory, but as the mandatory of the world, and in cases
where local and international interests conflict, the former may often have to give way.
It is essential, therefore, that the mandatory should be impartial and effective.
An “ international administration,” in the literal sense of mixed executive bodies, would
evidently be the very worst regime which could be devised to meet the special
Palestinian conditions, and should be decidedly ruled out. The practical choice lies
between a mandate to the United States or a mandate to Great Britain* From the
British point of view, the balance of advantage as between these two solutions is not
* It understood that the Arabs would be less opposed to Zionist aspirations hi Palestine if these were
to be realised under British auspices.