أوراق مكتوبة بالآلة الكاتبة وأوراق مطبوعة لمجلس الوزراء وأوراق برلمانية عن الأحداث في مصر [و‎‎١‎٠‎٥] (٥٢٠/٢٠٩)

Correspondence respecting Affairs in Egypt.
No. 1.
Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of
Kedleston.—(Received November 17.)
^Telegraphic.) Cairo, November 17, 1921.
MY following telegram contains text of a joint memorandum which
the British advisers to the Egyptian Government have handed to
me.
I consider it expedient that you should be informed of the
opinions of the advisers, as I understand that a further conference
with Adly Pasha will take place very shortly.
It is an unquestionable fact that any settlement of which Egypt
did not approve would render it difficult or even impracticable to
continue to carry out the administrative functions of the Govern
ment.
No. 2.
Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of
Kedleston.—(Received November 17.)
(Telegraphic.) Cairo, November 17, 1921.
FOLLOWING is memorandum referred to in my immediately
preceding telegram : —
“Adviser to Ministry of Interior, Acting Financial Adviser,
Adviser to Ministry of Education, and Acting Judicial Adviser are
unanimously of following view, that a decision which does not admit
principle of Egyptian independence and which maintains protec
torate must entail serious risk of revolution throughout the country
■and in any case result in complete administrative chaos, rendering
government impossible. It must be realised that the whole
structure of government is Egyptian and that British officials are,
almost exclusively, either in advisory, inspecting, or technical capa
cities. It is therefore impossible to exercise any British control
without full Egyptian co-operation in all branches of administration,
as was shown in the spring of 1919, when an attempt had been made
to carry on Government without a Ministry and with a considerable
portion of Egyptian staff on strike. Unless His Majesty’s Govern
ment are prepared to give substantial satisfaction to expectations
which Egyptians have legitimately formed on the basis of apparent
policy of His Majesty’s Government during the past two years, it
will be impossible to form any Ministry. Strong military
force acting with severity could doubtless preserve certain
measure of security to life and property in larger cities,