ملف من أوراق مطبوعة مصنفة تحت عنوان "التفاوض المصري" بين كرزون وعدلي باشا والوفد المصري [و‎‎٨‎٦] (١٧٨/١٧١)

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anomalous to outside observers, and which involves us in using it in an independent
country to support a Government which rests on no representative sanction, and, in
effect, to help the Ministerial party against the Opposition.
The condition of escaping from this situation, and also the condition of establishing
on a treaty basis those relations with an independent Egypt which it is the aim of
the policy of His Majesty’s Government to achieve, is, it seems to me, the setting up
of constitutional government. The accession to power of a Court party means delay
of unknown duration. The necessity of obtaining pledges in regard to matters of detail
implied by the reservations, ami our ultimate responsibility for maintaining order, are
calculated to entangle us with the new Ministry, which, so far as can be foreseen, would
either find very little support in the country, or would be forced to look for support to
Zaghlulist elements, whose desires they would hardly wish or be able to satisfy. In
most hostile opposition to the King and to such a Ministry, and, by implication, it is to
be feared, also to us, would tie found the very strong party of reasonable and progressive
views which centres about Adly Pasha, Sarwat Pasha and their associates.
In my opinion, therefore, it would be advantageous for us, for Egypt, and, I mav
add, for the King himself that the promulgation of the Constitution should not be
delayed.
I have just received from the Prime Minister an advance copy of the draft
Constitution, which has been handed to him. not yet officially, by the Constitution
Commission. I will send copies to your Lordship by the next bag.
I have, &c.
ALLENBY, FA/.,
High Commissioner.
Enclosure in (2).
Remarks by Sarwat Pasha.
SAB WAT loquitur :—
“ [ am o-oino- to tell you plainly what my plans are as far as I have formulated
them. The Constitution will be finished and ready by the end of September I shall
take a fortnight or so to consider it; I shall then discuss it with the King, and,
presuming that we arrive at a satisffictory decision, the Constitution will be promulgated
at the end of October ; November and December will be taken up with the preliminaries
of the elections ; the elections will be held in January, and Parliament will meet, say,
in February. . . , , t t t i
“ The one difficulty lies in the discussions with the King. 1 have always been
respectful to him. I have done what he wanted whenever I could without harm to the
principles for which I am working. I have given way on all matters not of vital
importance. His Majesty has at times made it very difficult for me to keep my temper,
but I have only failed once : that was when he sent for me and presented me with the
law about tlm Khedive. I was a little hurt, naturally, at having a ready-made law
thrust at me over the table ; but when it was accompanied by the words ‘ There, take
that ; see that it passes quickly, and no changes,’ it was too much for me, and I said :
‘ [ presume your Majesty will at least allow me to read it.’ I also said to Said
Xulfikar: ‘ Please tell His Majesty that 1 am a Prime Minister, not a functionary, and
that I come here to give advice, not to receive orders.’ Otherwise I have always been
as pleasant as it lies in me to be. . .
“ Don’t make any mistake about the King. He is nice enough and intelligent
enough but he has much too high an opinion or his own mental powers and he has no
idea of the r6le of a constitutional monarch. He is an intriguer—I could forgive him
much if he intrigued well, but everything that he does shows clearly the end he has in
v j ew . and he talks too much. It must be as clear to you as it is to me that all these
petty incidents that arise every few days are only of importance in so far as they are
connected with his main idea, which is to avoid by any possible means the inclusion in
the Constitution of ministerial responsibility to Parliament. This is a point on which l
shall never <nve way. It is the one thing for which we have fought, the one thing
about which there is unanimity in Egypt; and further, not only in the agreement of
the 28th February, but in all the preliminary negotiations, it is a clear condition of the
errant bv the British Government of independence. Personally, I would rather go back
u> direct British rule than be subject to an autocratic despotism of the tvpe which the
King wishes to create for himself. In the old days we used to play off the Khedive
against the British and the British against the Khedive. The King is trying that Same