ملف من أوراق مطبوعة مصنفة تحت عنوان "التفاوض المصري" بين كرزون وعدلي باشا والوفد المصري [و‎‎٨‎٠] (١٧٨/١٥٩)

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Egypt, to run the Soudan on the cheap. It is scarcely likely that such a policy
prove feasible when an Egyptian Parliament meets and demands the
L jj repaymen^ or at least the interest, on Egyptian advances.
Financial Pressure which Egypt could Exercise on the Soudan.
72. It is, therefore, quite possible that in order to maintain their control over
the Soudan, His Majesty’s Government will have to adopt a definitely irreconcilable
attitude towards Egyptian pretensions. The Egyptian Government might
t conceivably retort by cutting oft supplies of money. Tins could be effected, firstly,
by a refusal to remit to the Soudan Government customs dues collected at Egyptian
ports on goods in transit to the Soudan, and, secondly, by the withdrawal from the
Soudan of the native Egyptian battalions and the Egyptian officers of Soudanese
battalions, and by a refusal to make any contribution towards the defence of the
Soudan.
73. The first method vcould involve a loss to the Soudan of about 400,000Z. per
annum; it could be adopted without a definite breach with His Majesty’s Government
over the Soudan question, as under the terms of article 7 of the Anglo-Egyptian
Agreement it is not certain whether Egypt is under any obligation to make such
payments.
74. The second step, however, would mean the withdrawal by Egypt of the only
striking symbol of her sovereignty in the Soudan. The cost of defence thus thrown
upon the Soudan Government wxmld amount to about 1,250,000/. per annum, and as
under present conditions Soudan revenues barely balance expenditure, the country,
which is not yet self-supporting, would become bankrupt unless the British Treasury
could see their way to helping with a grant-in-aid of about 1,500,000/. to 2,000,000^.
per annum.
Strategic Importance of the Soudan.
75. The Soudan, however, will in time be self-supporting, and apart from its
financial prosperity it is strategical!}' the key position for the whole north-eastern
corner of Africa. The Power which holds the Soudan has Egypt at its mercy, and
through Egypt can dominate the Suez Canal. The Anglo-Egyptian Convention of
1809 was, as its author, Lord Cromer, was the first to admit, a diplomatic expedient
designed to establish a temporary modus oivendi, wLioh w T ould safeguard British
^ interests without calling for a large expenditure of British revenue. This purpose
it has fulfilled, but with Egypt “ an independent sovereign State ” in the words of
the declaration of the 28th Eebruary, 1922, the attitude of an Egyptian Government
* responsible to a popularly elected Parliament may, at any moment, render difficult, if
not impossible, the administration of the Soudan on present lines in accordance
w ith the terms of the 1899 convention. In Lord Cromer’s own w^ords, that instrument
“ was of necessity, to some extent, the child of opportunism. Should it eventually
die and make place for some more robust, because more real, political creation, its
authors need not bewail its fate.’’
Eventual Revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Convention.
76. When this prophecy is fulfilled it is essential that His Majesty's
Government should not be exposed to the chairge of having been the first to tear up
a convention to which a British Government was a party. On the other hand, if
Egypt should denounce or repudiate that convention it must be remembered that
annexation of the Soudan by Great Britain would to-day be welcomed by a majority
of the population. Ten years hence this majority may have shrunk or even
disappeared, twenty years hence it will almost certaiiy have done so, as by then a
Soudanese nationalism wdll have come into being. /
J. MURRAY.
January 4, 1923.