ملف من أوراق مطبوعة مصنفة تحت عنوان "التفاوض المصري" بين كرزون وعدلي باشا والوفد المصري [و‎‎٤‎٧] (١٧٨/٩٣)

[This Docmneat is the Property ef His Britannic Majesty’s Government.]
CONFIDENTIAL
EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS.
Minute by Mk. Murray.
Situation in Egypt if a breakdown occurs.
1. IN this event it is almost inevitable that Adly will feel obliged to resign office
on his return to Egypt. It is doubtful whether any Egyptian would then have the
courage to form a Ministry—even of affairs—once it was plain that the offer of His
Majesty’s Government did not go as far in meeting Egyptian aspirations as that of the
Milner Mission.
2. We should run the risk of a revolutionary movement breaking out, though it
is more probable that in the first instance, at any rate, Egyptian resentment would take
the form of an attempt to paralyse administration by partial or general strikes of the
civil servants—a form of pressure which is difficult to combat, as we discovered in
3. The Extremists would not find it difficult to prevent a Ministry prepared to
co-operate with the* High Commissioner from taking office by resort to methods of
terrorism which would be impossible to suppress without the collaboration of the
Egyptian police. ( 2 )
4. If, therefore, a breakdown is inevitable, it is essential that it should occur
over a point or points as to which we shall have all foreign sympathies in and out of
Egypt on our side ; and if a considerable measure of Egyptian sympathy is also to be
won, our offer, looked at as a whole, must be at least as good as Lord Milner’s.
Questions so far discussed with Delegation.
5. Three main issues have so far been considered, namely:—
(i.) The British forces in Egypt.
(ii.) Foreign relations.
(iii.) Financial and judicial control.
As regards (i), the delegation have been asked to accept four reasons for the
presence of British troops, viz. : —
(a.) The protection of our Imperial communications.
(6.) The defence of Egypt from external aggression,
(c.) The protection of foreigners.
(d.) The maintenance of order.
The delegation accept (a) and (6) subject to the condition that our troops and
auxiliary services are in peace time confined to a zone not far removed from the Canal.
As regards (c) and (d) they take the line that these two reasons are really one and the
same and they refuse to admit their validity.
6. Their point that (c) and (d) are really the same is good in that the need for
protecting foreigners will only arise when disorder has broken out or is threatening,
and conversely, when disorder is threatening, foreigners will always be in danger. The
disturbances of 1919 and the recent Alexandria riots prove this.
7. As regards the condition which the delegation seek to impose in connection
with (a) and (b), we can usefully argue that the confinement of British troops to a zone
would prevent them furnishing any protection to foreigners, which is the one and only
reason which makes their presence in Egypt welcome to all Europeans and to a
considerable if silent body of native opinion.(b
8. It would seem clear, therefore, that over the question of troops we have no
concession of substance to make, but that if a break occurs on this point it will do so
in conditions favourable to His Majesty’s Government.
(B Mr. Amos would like to paint this bogey even blacker than I have done.—J. M.
( 2 ) Such a situation inevitably produces a rapid degeneration of the political situation.— R. C. L.
( 3 ) And it is technically absurd. No soldier could assent to it for one moment.—R.C.L.
421b [6G95]