ملف من أوراق مطبوعة مصنفة تحت عنوان "التفاوض المصري" بين كرزون وعدلي باشا والوفد المصري [ظ‎‎٣‎٤] (١٧٨/٦٨)

During peace the Egyptians considered that the occupation of their country
should cease. Lord Milner had, however, pointed out to them the importance to Great
Britain of maintaining troops in Egypt from the point of view of Imperial com
munications. The Egyptians were prepared to admit this, in spite of the fact that
the presence of British troops must naturally appear incompatible with the new regime
of independence. But on the understanding that the troops were there in purely
British interests and for stiategic reasons, and were not to be used against Egypt nor
interfere in her internal affairs, on that understanding they were prepared to agree to
their presence. This was explained in the text of the Milner memorandum, to which
Adly Pasha referred. I his memorandum had subsequently been sent to Egypt, and
four delegates had gone there to explain it to the Egyptian people. The explanation
they had given with regard to the presence of the troops was that thev would be
situated in the zone of the Suez Canal, for from the Egyptian point of view it was held
that any danger to British Imperial communications that might exist was in the zone
of the Canal, and they had the clear impression that Lord Mijner would accept the zone
of the Canal as the locality in which British troops should be situated.
Lord Curzon here interjected that this had never been Lord Milner’s point of view,
although it had been strongly urged upon him by the former Egyptian delegation.
Adly Pasha admitted that this was so, but said that Lord Milner ha 1 only definitely
refused to consider the proposal that troops should be relegated to the Asiatic side of
the Canal, and that he had agreed to their not being located in the large towns, such
as Cairo
Lord Curzon quoted from page 29 of the Milner Report, which proved that Lord
Milner had insisted on this question being left open.
Adly Pasha maintained that he and his colleagues had then had the impression
that the idea that British troops should be in the region of the Canal was admitted,
although no actual place had ever been specified. In any case, the four delegates who
returned to Egypt had explained the memorandum in this sense, and it had been
understood that not only the troops but aerodromes and other military establishments
would be confined to the zone of the Canal.
Ihen came the publication of the report, in which Lord Milner left the question
open on the ground that Great Britain had other communications through Egypt,
besides in the zone of the Canal. The Egyptians, however, had still hope that some
zone could be found where the retention of troops would suffice to protect all British
Imperial communications.
Adly Pasha went on to say that Lord Curzon had now given them his views of the
reasons necessitating the presence of British troops. The first of these was the
protection of Imperial communications in peace and war. So far as war conditions
were concerned, the delegation agreed, but they hoped that it would be possible during
peace to guard Imperial communications by the presence of a force confined to a
certain zone.
\\ ith regard to the second reason that Lord Curzon had given, namely, assisting
Egypt to defend her territory, they considered that, as an alliance was to exist, it was
an interference with the independence and sovereignty of Egypt to keep a British
force in the.country for this purpose. An alliance does not imply the presence of
troops in peace-time, and it would not be necessary for other reasons. Egypt is a rich
country, with a population of 14,000,(JOG. In conditions of independence the Egyptian
people would be able to arrange for their own defence, and, should they be attacked,
there would be time for assistance to be sent to them by their allies. Such was the
general usage between allies in times of peace, where military conventions were
generally concluded to settle the measures to be taken in war.
Before Adly Pasha concluded Ins statement, Lord Curzon enquired whether any
of his colleagues wished to add to what had already been said.
Rushdi Pasha stated that the British forces could not have the same objective in
peace-time as they would have in war.
Lord Curzon urged the conference not to attach too much importance to words
and phrases. Lie said that Adly and Rushdi Pashas had both spoken of interference
with Egypt s sovereign rights ; this phrase was merely words. If, as soon as they
began to discuss how many troops were to be in this place and how many in that, they
were to be told that their presence would interfere with Egypt’s sovereignty, no
progress could be made. It was no pleasure to His Majesty’s Government to keep
forces in Egypt ; on the contrary, it was most expensive, and he would have to talk
about the financial aspect very plainly later on. Great Britain could not afford to
sustain unaided the entire cost of keeping troops in Egypt There was no necessity