ملف من أوراق مطبوعة مصنفة تحت عنوان "التفاوض المصري" بين كرزون وعدلي باشا والوفد المصري [ظ‎‎٣‎١] (١٧٨/٦٢)

Lord Curzon then passed to the consideration of foreign relations—a difficult and
complex question. He said that when Lord Milner returned from Egypt he made a
preliminary report, which had not been published, as it had been superseded by the
report with which they were familiar. In the first report he took the view that the
control of foreign relations should be given to the High Commissioner. After his return
from Egypt, however, as a result of the negotiations which took place in London last
summer, his views were altered, as was apparent from the expression given to them in
the final report, from which Lord Curzon then read an extract.
He pointed out that while acknowledging the weight of the considerations urged
from the Egyptian point of view with regard to this matter, Lord Milner had at the
same time stated forcibly the arguments on the other side. It was apparent, therefore,
that this proposal was one concerning which Lord Milner himself entertained grave
doubts, and feared that it might excite considerable opposition in this country. It had
since been discussed in the Cabinet with the Imperial Premiers, who had shared Lord
Milner’s doubts and tears. In one respect H is Majesty’s Government shared the Egyptian
view. The conditions under which, since the protectorate, the Egyptian Government hail
ceased to have a Minister for Foreign Atiairs and a Foreign Office, ought to be discontinued
under the hew arrangement. Before the declaration of the protectorate they had had both
a Minister for Foreign Affairs and a Foreign Office, and they should have them in the
future. His Majesty’s Government were also agreed that foreign Powers should be repre
sented in Egypt by representatives with whom the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs
would deal. Some clause, however, should be introduced to the effect that the Minister
for Foreign Affairs should act in close consultation witii the High Commissioner. This
was necessary, among other reasons, because foreign Powers, once they surrendered their
capitulatory privileges, would turn to the High Commissioner, who would have to be in
a position to reassure them. Lord Curzon hoped there would be no difficulty with
regard to this part of the arrangement. Where it was possible that difficulty might
arise, was with regard to representation of Egyptian interests abroad. This was a
matter with regard to which the Cabinet and the Imperial Premiers felt strongly.
Supposing Egypt had her own representatives abroad, Lord Curzon had no doubt that
they would, in most cases, behave in a manner altogether satisfactory, from a British
point of view; but he foresaw that occasions might arise, where, by adopting another
line of conduct, such representatives might create a situation of great difficulty and
danger. In existing circumstances, such incidents would no doubt not occur, but the
world was moving fast, and in the future some Egyptian Government might be in power
holding views very different from those entertained by the present Administration, which
might induce them to embark upon a course which would lead to trouble between the two
countries. It was therefore the view of His Majesty’s Government that, while the
Egyptian Foreign Office and Minister for Foreign Affairs should be reconstructed, and
while Egypt should enjoy the right to appoint in foreign capitals consuls who would
have charge of her commercial and other interests, she should, so far as political
transactions were concerned, rely upon the services of His Majesty’s representatives.
Lord Curzon apprehended that the delegation would contest this view; he would
gladly hear their observations, but would remind them of what Lord Milner had said,
and would add that he shared Lord Milner’s views, and that they were shared and held
even more strongly by the Cabinet. It was therefore important that the delegation
should realise how they stood with regard to this matter. He was prepared to discuss
it with them now or to postpone the discussion if they preferred.
Adly Pasha at once said that this was a question which, from the point of view of
Egypt, was essential. He said that representation abroad was the real expression and
affirmation of the independent status of the country. Without it he felt that he could
never maintain that the country was independent. Apart also from this—the main
consideration—the Egyptian people wished to be in close touch with all the great
nations of the world and with all aspects of modern progress. It was impossible to
keep this up without representatives in the principal countries. So far as the dangef,
to which lord Curzon had referred, was concerned, he was not prepared to admit, in
the first place, that Egypt would desire to intrigue with any other Power; he asked
what object they could have in doing so. But even if they did desire to do so,
they would not probably make use of official representatives for this purpose. He
referred to the case of Baron Oppenheim, the principal agent of German intiigue in
Egypt before the war, <is instancing the use of unofficial representatives for such
purposes. If a country desired to intrigue, means of doing so could always be found.
Official representatives, on the other hand, had certain responsibilities which would
prevent them, as a rule, from indulging in intrigue. He himself did not see the