ملف من أوراق مطبوعة مصنفة تحت عنوان "التفاوض المصري" بين كرزون وعدلي باشا والوفد المصري [ظ‎‎٢‎٨] (١٧٨/٥٦)

4
On reaching the next paragraph in the memorandum embodying their reser\es which
apparently dealt with the Soudan, Adly Pasha said that this was a ^ ery complex
question ; that it was impossible to say in a few words exactly what their views weie,
and that they would prefer to postpone discussion of this matter for the present.
Lord Curzon agreed to their doing so.
Lord Curzon then enquired whether these were all the reserves of the delegation.
Adly replied that he was unable to go so far as definitely to say that they had no
further reserves, but that these were the reserves of the country and w T ere supported by
the delegation. In the course of negotiations, however, other points would arise with
regard to which they might have to formulate “ precisions.”
Lord Curzon enquired whether there v 3 * * * 7 ere any other observations of a gei eral
character which the delegation would like to make at this stage.
Adly Pasha replied that they would prefer to make their observations on each
point as it arose.
Lord Curzon then said that one of the most important questions which would
arise, and which did not figure in the reserves, w^as the disposal of British troops in
Egypt. Other matters would be bound to depend on that, and it would therefore be
of the greatest help to obtain at this stage a general idea of the views of the
delegation with regard to this question. It had been discussed at great length last
year and he believed that it figured in the reserves then formulated, although not in
those put forward to-day.
Adly Pasha replied that this question had been discussed at great length in the
negotiations with Lord Milner, who had insisted on the presence of troops in Egypt,
and it had been sought to give their presence a character not incompatible with
Egyptian independence. It was understood that they w^re to be there for the
protection of the communications of the British Empire against exterior aggression, but
the Milner Report showed it was not only the Canal which Great Britain was anxious to
protect, but it was desired also to protect communications from attack by land and
air. That was a point which the Egyptian delegation had not been able to follow, and
which they wished to go into. They would like to define more precisely the duties of
the troops to be maintained in Egypt, and the places at which they were to be
stationed. Above all they desired to know exactly what it was that necessitated their
presence.
Lord Curzon replied that his Excellency was quite right and that it was most
important to arrive at an understanding as to the objects for which the troops were
there ; it would then obviously be easitr to discuss the numbers that it was necessary
to maintain and the places at which it vras necessary to maintain them. This question
had already been considered by the Cabinet, and the following would appear to be the
principal objects for which British troops would be required :—
1. Protection of Imperial Communications.
This did not refer only to the Suez Canal. The geographical position of Egypt
invested her with great importance from the point of view of the British Empire.
There was, for instance, the question of air communications. This meant the main
tenance of aerodromes. Egypt was the central point on the route for the East.
Great Britain must therefore maintain aerodromes in Egypt and aerodromes must be
guarded. Protection of Imperial communications, which must be understood in its
widest sense, was the first object of maintaining troops in Egypt. It was not, however,
the only object.
2. Defence of Egyptian Frontiers.
The frontiers of Egypt were liable to attack by land from the west, south and east.
In the recent war British troops had protected Egypt from an extremely formidable
attack by the Turks. History might repeat itself and a similar attack might be
attempted in the future.
3. Protection of Foreigners.
Under the new arrangements, after the abolition of the Capitulations, foreign
Powers enjoying special rights in Egypt would transfer them to Great Britain, and, in
the future, should the rights or interests of other Europeans — French of Italian, for
instance—be injured in Egvpt, it would be to Great Britain that the Governments ot
those countries would turn for satisfactfon. Great Britain must, therefore, be in a
position to safeguard those rights.