ملف من أوراق مطبوعة مصنفة تحت عنوان "التفاوض المصري" بين كرزون وعدلي باشا والوفد المصري [ظ‎‎٢‎٢] (١٧٨/٤٤)

38
of Egypt, would give to Great Britain all those safeguards and guarantees which the
Protectorate, as we understood it, was intended to secure. The greater part ol our
subsequent work lay in examining this possibility, and our aim throughout has been
to find the basis of a Treaty which should supersede all debates about words and
phrases, and be the sole and final definition of the relations of Great Britain and
Egypt.
There is nothing new in the recognition of Egyptian independence by Great
Britain. Throughout our occupation we have most carefully respected the theory
that Egypt was a national unit under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey, and
when we abolished the Turkish suzerainty we deliberately chose to proclaim a
Protectorate in preference to annexing Egypt or making her part of the British
Empire. We have constantly renewed our promise of self-government for Egypt.
We are of opinion that the fulfilment of this promise cannot be postponed. The
spirit of Egyptian Nationalism cannot be extinguished, and, though it may always
be possible to suppress its more violent manifestations, the government of the country
in the teeth of a hostile people, who charge us with breach of faith, must be a
difficult and distasteful task, alike to those who take part in it and to the British
people who are responsible for it.
But there are formidable difficulties in the way of any sudden or complete
transfer of all the powers of government to Egyptian hands. There are essential*
British interests to be upheld; it is also imperative to ensure the safety and protect
the rights of the large number of foreign residents whose presence in Egypt differen
tiates her position from that of other Eastern countries and greatly complicates the
problem.
The essential British interests are that the great Imperial communications
which pass through Egyptian territory shall not be jeopardised, either by internal
disturbances or foreign aggression; that they shall be available in time of war. and
for necessary purposes in time of peace; that the struggle for ascendency in Egypt
between rival Powers shall not be renewed ; and, finally, that an independent Egypt
shall not pursue a foreign policy hostile or prejudicial to that of the British
Empire. It is therefore necessary that any Treaty entered into between us and the
Egyptians should secure the special position of the British representative in Egypt,
enable us to maintain an army on Egyptian territory for the protection of our
Imperial communications, and take adequate security that Egyptian policy shall be
in line with that of the British Empire.
The protection of foreign rights presents a problem of even greater complexity.
These are at present secured by the Capitulations. But the Capitulations are the
greatest of all the disabilities from which Egypt now suffers (see note on p. 19).
The multiplicity of jurisdictions arising out of them, and the facilities which they
give to men of uncertain nationality to escape from the local jurisdiction greatly
complicate the problem of law and order; while the exemption of foreigners from
direct taxation, other than the land and house tax, cripples the Government in
raising revenue, since it is in practice impossible to impose on Egyptians taxes from
which foreigners are exempt. Thus, although the wealth of the country is rapidly
increasing and its resources are mrw ample for all the needs of good government, the
Administration has for some time past been compelled to starve essential public
services, such as Education and Public Health. During the war it has only been
possible to raise sufficient revenue for the auxiliary police (Ghafftrs) by a special tax
imposed under Martial Law.
It was evident to us that, without the removal of these restrictions, no Egyptian
Government could enjoy any real independence. To leave an Egyptian Ministry to
struggle with conditions which threatened to bring the present Administration to
a stand-still would be to foredoom it to failure. We foresaw that, if the Capitulations
were maintained, the Egyptian Government without British support would in all
probability be exposed to a competing pressure of foreign influences, which might
paralyse its action. It was therefore clearly in the interests of Egypt that the
Capitulations should be removed and the Mixed Tribunals reorganised so as to
enable them to take over the jurisdiction of the Consular Courts and to act in
criminal as well as civil suits affecting foreigners. But this could only be effected
through the mediation of Great Britain, and Great Britain could only expect to
succeed in inducing the Powers to part with their present privileges, if she were in a
position to assure them that solvency would be maintained and that the lives and
property of foreigners would be secure. Our efforts were accordingly directed to
securing for Great Britain such a position as would enable her to give this necessary
assurance. In order to aohieve this object, it is necessary that any Treaty should
provide for the right of Great Britain ^ intervene in legislation affecting foreigners