ملف من أوراق مطبوعة مصنفة تحت عنوان "التفاوض المصري" بين كرزون وعدلي باشا والوفد المصري [و‎‎١‎٢] (١٧٨/٢٣)

17
the problem led us to take a more hopeful view. From many and intimate conversa
tions with representative Egyptians, including some who were commonly regarded
as extreme Nationalists, the conviction w r as borne in upon us, that they were not so
intransigeant, and certainly not so anti-British, as the frantic diatribes of the press
might have led us to suppose. The broad banner of Nationalism was seen to cover
many shades of opinion, and, above all, most notable differences of temper and of
aim. I ndoubtedly there are a number of Nationalists whose fundamental hatred
of all foreign, and especially all British, control leads them to commit, or at any rate
sympathise with, acts of lawlessness and crime. Not only are their aims wholly
incompatible with any sort of understanding between British and Egyptians, but
they are prepared to pursue them by methods which nothing could justify and which
no Government could do otherwise than strive to repress. They are deliberately
encouraging a system oi terrorism, which is intended to render any co-operation
between British and Egyptians impossible in the future.
I he untow ard events of the last few' years in Egypt itself and the restless and
revolutionary spirit throughout the whole world, which has had a strong repercussion
in that country, have undoubtedly been grist to the mill of this extreme section and
have given a more sinister character to the Nationalist movement. No wonder that,
under these circumstances, Nationalism has appeared to many British people on the
spot, and perhaps to even more at home, to be synonymous with violent Anglophobia
and to be aiming at the complete subversion of the existing system of government in
Egypt.
But we were satisfied, even before leaving Cairo, that it would be a profound
mistake to take this sweeping view. It would be wrong to allow the impressions of
a period of turbulence, like the preceding twelve months, to blind us to what is
reasonable and legitimate in the aspirations of Egyptian Nationalism. Such an
indiscriminating attitude could only tend to drive moderate men more and more into
the camp of the Extremists and to convert the present deplorable friction between
British and Egyptians, w r hioh is not incapable of being remedied, into bitter and
enduring hostility. Violence and disorder must, of course, be suppressed, and here let
us say that the measures taken to that end during our stay in Egypt were as temperate
as they were effective. The necessity of continuing to maintain Martial Law in
Egypt is regrettable, but under Lord Allenby Martial Law r was being administered
with the minimum of severity or of disturhan *e to the normal course of justice and
the everyday life of the people. The duty of promptly suppressing violence and
disorder must not, however, lead us to confound all those who are in a greater or
less degree opposed to the existing system of government with the pronounced
revolutionaries, or simple criminals, who w^ere responsible for the outbreak of the
spring of 1919 and the sporadic acts of violence which have been perpetrated since.
In talking to many men who professed Nationalist opinions—and indeed it was
difficult to find anyone who repudiated all sympathy with them—w'e encountered a
\er\ different spirit from that which found expression in such detectable outrages.
These men denounced the resort to violence, or open rebellion, as not only criminal, but
useless. Great Britain—such was the general view—was more than strong enough to
keep Egypt in permanent subjection, if she preferred unwilling subjects to friendly
and grateful allies. For they all recognised, with more or less warmth and spontaneity,
the great benefits which Great Britain had conferred upon Egypt, while most of them
also recognised that Egypt still stood in need of British assistance, not only in the work
of internal reconstruction, but for her defence against foreign interference, and the
danger of once more becoming the arena of international rivalry and intrigue. Thev
all, without exception, admitted that Great Britain had a very special interest in
Egypt, as the central link in her communications with her Eastern Empire and the
Austialasian Dominions, and a perfect right to safeguard these communications
from any danger of interruption. But w^as it necessary for the fulfilment of these
objects to deprive Egypt of her independence, to try to convert her into an integral
part of the British Empire, and to run counter to the ineradicable desire of^the
Egyptians to take their place, as a distinct people, among the nations of the world?
Would not an orderly and friendly Egypt, in intimate association with Great Britain,
serve British purposes as well, or even better, while removing all sense of grievance
and all spirit of revolt on the Egyptian side ? Moreover, was not such a consumma
tion the only one consistent with the avowed policy of Great Britain, with her
reiterated declarations, that it was not her intention to appropriate Egypt, or to
incornorate her in the British Empire, but to make her capable of standing on her
own feet ? In the sincerity of these declarations they had long believed, but were
now ceasing to believe. After nearly forty years of British occupation, they seemed
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