ملف من أوراق مطبوعة مصنفة تحت عنوان "التفاوض المصري" بين كرزون وعدلي باشا والوفد المصري [ظ‎‎١‎١] (١٧٨/٢٢)

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The fellahin, when left alone, are not unfriendly to the British. No doubt
they do not love any foreigner, and as fervent Moslems they start with a certain
antipathy to any Christian. But, in the case of the British, these initial prejm ices
have to a large extent been overcome by experience of the^integrity and km mess
of the general run of British officials and by the manifest improvement which their
presence has wrought in the condition of rural Egypt. It is true that a new geneia
tion. which has never known the evils of the old regime, is less grateful to us than
were their fathers, by whom these evils were vividly remembered. But the tellahin,
though much less helpless and submissive than in former times, ha\e still cause o
dread the rapacity of landowners and the bullying and extortion of a good number
of native officials, and against these dangers they feel that British influence anor s
them a certain protection. Those unfortunate incidents of the war period, to which
we have already alluded, shook for a time their confidence in our justice an
good-will, and were predisposing causes of the savage outbreak of anti-British teelmg
in the spring of 1919. But these excesses were abnormal and short-lived. Except
where they are directly stirred up by agitation from the towns, the tellahin appear
to be once more reasonably well disposed to those British people whom the) know,
and who know how to handle them. We were greatly struck by the evidence a
number of our countrymen, official and unofficial, living in close contact with the
Egyptian peasantry, who affirmed that the bitter feeling of the last year or two
had now r subsided, and that Englishmen who conducted themselves properly were as
welcome as ever in the countryside.
But it is idle to hope that the comparatively satisfactory attitude ot the
peasantry will long be maintained, if our relations with the middle and upper classes
of their countrymen continue as strained as at present. Nationalism has, lor the
time being at any rate, established complete dominance over all that is vocal and
articulate in Egypt. From the Princes of the Sultan s family down to the children
of the primary schools, the men of property, the professional men, the religious
teachers, the literati, the journalists, the students and school-boys have all, more or
less willingly, been swept into the Nationalist movement. Most serious of all,
perhaps, it now permeates the official class and the upper ranks of the army.
Discipline and official decorum may prevent their sympathies finding open expression
—the attitude of Egyptian officials towards the Mission was always courteous and
correct—but in their hearts they are mostly strong Nationalists, and the influence
radiating from them is all in the same direction. It is inconceivable that the senti
ment of their social superiors of every class, of all the men who make opinion, should
not in the long run profoundly affect the mass of the people. No doubt Nationalism
as a political creed has little attraction for these unlettered millions, though they can
easily be taught to repeat its catchwords. But then it is not so much
b\ abstract political arguments that the extremist agitator seeks to win
their support, as by the constant vilification of everything British and by
subtly attributing every local disaster and every personal grievance to the malignity
or incompetence of British officials. This campaign of mendacious denigration is
carried on by many agencies, by preachers in the mosques, by country-bred students
returning for the holidays, by all but a few organs of the Arabic press. It is true
that the fellah cannot, as a rule, read himself, but he can always be read to, and if
everything that is spoken or written to influence him points the same way, the false
hoods so sedulously instilled cannot fail ultimately to poison his mind.
We make allowance for the fact that at the time of our visit anti-British clamour
was exceptionally intense. It was no doubt artificially stimulated by the more
extreme section in order to impress us. And no man of any experience in such
matters would mistake the extravagances of a political agitation at fever pitch for
the deliberate expression of the mind of a people. But it is a significant fact, that,
while many Egyptians undoubtedly disapproved of the excesses of this agitation, no
one, who was not compelled to do so by his official position, made any effort to stem
them. Men of standing, whatever their personal views, were much too nervous of
appearing to be out of sympathy with national “ aspirations ” to exercise any
moderating or restraining influence. No one would have dared to say that he was
in favour of the “ Protectorate.” or that he was not in favour of “complete indepen
dence.” To all outward appearance, independent opinion was solidly Nationalist.
And in our judgment it is likely to remain so.
The position is undoubtedly a serious one, and in face of this solid phalanx of
opposition it might seem at first sight as if we had no choice but either to abandon
our position in Egypt altogether, or to maintain it by sheer force, in the teeth of the
general and ever-increasing hostility of the Egyptian people. But a closer study of