أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [و‎‎١‎٥‎٨] (٣٤٨/٣١٥)

3
to your Excellency No. 473 of the 9th February—that there has been so far no break
in the negotiations, that they continue, and that it is of the utmost importance to
resume the discussions with the Turks at the point where they were left at the moment
of the temporary adjournment of the Lausanne Conference ? In the note now under
reply it is said that when it becomes impossible ever to arrive at a collective peace
between the allies and Turkey, it would be unreasonable to contend that no separate
treaty might be concluded with that Power by any one of the allies. 'The contingency
so contemplated must be assumed to be a failure on the part of the allies to agree among
themselves as to the conditions of peace to be put forward in common, the implication
being that it ought not to be left in the power of one recalcitrant ally, or group of
allies, to prevent the conclusion of peace by holding out against conditions considered
acceptable by the others. Without here entering on a discussion of the juridical value
of this argument in the light of the very precise language of the Declarations of 1914
and 1915, I would observe that the above is not the contingency which has actually
arisen, or which is threatening to arise. It is a very different situation with
which the allies are at present faced. There is no disagreement between them
as to the conditions of peace. On the contrary, they have with complete unanimity
presented to Turkey a draft treaty which they have all declared to represent their
common views and aims. If there is a danger of a breakdown of the present
negotiations, it can only be because the enemy may refuse the terms on which
the allies are agreed. Whatever juridical interpretation might be placed upon the
wording of the Declaration of 1914, it is to be doubted whether even by the most
ingenious casuistry the terms of that covenant could be twisted in such a way as to justify
one of its signatories in concluding a separate peace with an enemy Power after joint
allied terms had been presented to and rejected by that Power.
10. Nevertheless, these are the circumstances in which M. Poincare now officially
proclaims the right and the intention of France to sever herself from her allies, in
contravention of the solemn engagement which formed the basis of Anglo-French
co-operation throughout the war and during the critical years that followed, and to
enter upon an independent course of action in the interest of France alone. The
language of his note, and the form which he has given to it, leave no apparent
doubt as to his resolve. Nor is that resolve deprived of any part of its precision
by the assurance which he has been good enough to add that, when he proposes to act
in the manner described, he will, as a special mark of his confidence and friendship,
inform His Majesty’s government in advance of his intention.
11. M. Poincare’s announcement seems in reality calculated to endanger the
continuance of the Anglo-French alliance which has rested on the pact of 1914 as
its foundation. It can hardly be interpreted in any other sense. And yet it is difficult
to believe that the French government can have taken into full consideration the
consequences that might be expected to ensue from the plan of action foreshadowed
by M. Poincare, if carried into effect. In the eyes of His Majesty’s government,
no issue more grave could have been raised. It is therefore important that they
should be authoritatively informed whether the significance of M. Poincare’s pronounce
ment is meant to be such as, in their view, his words imply.
12. Your Excellency will read this despatch to M. Poincare and hand him a copy
of it, should he so desire.
I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.