أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [و‎‎١‎٥‎١] (٣٤٨/٣٠١)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.!
TURKEY. [November 11.]
CONFIDENTIAL. Section 1.
[E 12514/27/44] No. 1.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).
(No. 3391.)
My Lord, Foreign Office, November 11, 1922.
THE French Ambassador asked to see me this afternoon with regard to the
Eastern question and the approaching conference. He had in his hands a letter from
M. Poincare which had been rendered somewhat out of date by the proceedings of the
past few days, and I therefore asked him to allow me to deal with the situation as it now
stood.
There was, I said, no longer any question that the conference should meet on the
13th November. For some time past, a meeting on that date had evidently been
impossible. Few, if any, of the delegations, including the French, were prepared
to he in Lausanne in two days’ time. The Turks had gone there knowing perfectly
well that there would not be anyone to meet them, and having, as I knew, intimated
privately that they were quite prepared to spend the ensuing week before the 20th
in Pans or elsewhere. The date of the 20th had now been definitely fixed and
notified to all the States concerned, who were taking measures accordingly. The
really important thing was, not the date of the conference, but what was to be
done by France and ourselves before it met. 1 could not, 1 told the Ambassador,
exaggerate the importance, and even the indispensability, of reaching a prior
understanding between France and Great Britain, and if possible Italy also, in that
interval. Without such an understanding, I was not prepared to enter the conference
at all. I could not submit my Government and my country to the humiliation of open
disagreement with our principal Allies at the conference table, in the eyes of the I urks
and before the face of Europe. 1 was not prepared, once again, as I bad had to do on
at least three previous occasions, to fight- a battle against the French and Italians in
combination, and to make concessions, in order to arrive at an Allied agreement which
was forgotten or broken as soon as it had been concluded. When we reached Lausanne,
either we should have to yield to Turkey all along the field, or there must be a definite
understanding under which France, Italy, and ourselves undertook to side together and
even to break up the conference sooner than yield, buch an understanding could not
be secured, as M. Poincare had suggested, by my calling at the Quai d’Orsay for a
conversation of an hour or two with him on my way to Lausanne. Supposing that, in
such a case, we failed to come to an agreement: was I to be vested with the sole
responsibility of breaking up the conference by returning to England, or was I to
proceed to Lausanne wirh the certainty that on all important points I was going to be
deserted by my Allies ? No, the conversation and the understanding must both
take place under conditions that were free from any such danger. I had myself
proposed three alternatives to M. Poincare. The first was that Signor Mussolini should
o^o to Paris, see M. Poincare, and then C'»me to London. I his might be difficult,
owing to the possible inability of the Italian Prime Minister to leave Italy at present.
The second alternative was that M. Poincare should empower M. Barrbre, after
conversations with the Italian Government, to come to London and make an agreement
with me. But as to this there was uncertainty whether M. Poincare would be willing
to invest M. BanAre with trie requisite powers. The third, and much the best, solution
would be that M. Poincare should do me the honour of coming to London in the middle
of next week and having a conversation here. During the last year and a halt, 1 had
gone, as British Foreign Minister, four times to Paris for similar discussions; and 1
thought that the time had arrived when the compliment might be returned. I could
not myself leave London in the course of next week, and I thought that public opinion
here would resent these repeated rushes of the British Foreign Minister to the Quai
d’Orsav. It was for the French Prime Minister to say what he considered the best
manner of dealing with the case ; but, unless an opportunity were created and unless a
definite understanding were arrived at, I did not myself see any advantage in proceeding
with the Lausanne Conference at all. There would be less humiliation in retiring before
the conference met than in beating a retreat after its sittings bad begun. In any case
the course would be difficult enough, and my plan was the only means of removing the
main obstacles from the path.
[172 1—1]