أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [و‎‎١‎٤‎٤] (٣٤٨/٢٨٧)

[This Docnment is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s GoTemment.]
EASTERN (Turkey). [October 18.j
CONFIDENTIAL. Section 1.
[E 11262/27/44] No. 1.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to M. Poincare.
My dear President, Foreign Office, October 18, 1922.
I AM much obliged for the full and frank statement of your views regarding the
Near East Conference contained in your letters of the 14th and Ibth October, and I am
happy to find that we are already agreed on a large number of points.
I am glad that you are willing to accept Lausanne as the seat of the conference.
I share your view as to expediting the date of meeting, but there is now barely more
than a fortnight before the 1st November, and I think it would be physically impossible
for the various delegations to make their arrangements as regards hotel accommoda
tion, &c., by that date, even if we had already fixed on the seat of the conference.
Moreover, the uncertainty of the internal political situation both here and in Italy
calls for consideration. From this point of view, a too early assembling of the
conference might meet with practical obstacles, and it would be unfortunate if, when
the conference assembled, a full representation of all the principal countries were not
at once forthcoming. To my mind, the important point is to announce a date as soon
as possible for the opening of the conference to show the Angora Government that we
are as anxious as they for an early meeting. It is comparatively immaterial whether,
for physical reasons, the date be fixed at the beginning or the middle of November,
and I therefore propose the 13th November as the most convenient and, in all
probability, the earliest practicable date in all the circumstances.
We are happily in agreement regarding the role of the League of Nations in
dealing with the Straits question in its final stage. As regards the conference itself,
however, I still prefer my plan that there should be a single conference meeting at
Lausanne which should deal on a specified date at a later stage in its sittings with the
Straits, admitting other Powers, such as Russia and the Black Sea States, to the
discussions, rather than your proposal for two distinct and concurrent conferences in
different places, one for the Peace Treaty and the other for the Straits. The latter question
cannot in reality be regarded or treated as distinct from the Peace Treaty, of which it
forms an inseparable part. We shall almost certainly find it necessary to include in
the treaty some general definition of the freedom of the Straits, even if the details of
its application be elaborated in a separate instrument and handed for execution to the
League of Nations. Further, the Straits question is at once so complex and so
important that it is neither desirable nor indeed possible to have it examined and
treated by plenipotentiaries and experts other than those who are dealing with the
main treaty. These objections make it, to my mind, impossible to hold two different
conferences in two different places, and it will be found that the analogy of the Paris
Conference of 1856, which you quote, strongly favours my contention. That
conference drew up firstly a Peace Treaty to end the Crimean war, signed by Great
Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey, on the 30th March
(ratifications exchanged 27th April), and secondly, a Straits convention (which, by
article 10 of the Peace Treaty, was to be regarded as annexed to the treaty), signed
by precisely the same Powers and the same plenipotentiaries on the same day and at
the same place, with ratifications exchanged on the same day as the Peace Treaty.
As regards the procedure for admitting the de facto Governments to the
discussions on the Straits question, I am disposed to accept your Excellency’s
ingenious suggestion, which seems to be well designed to give legitimate satisfaction
to Russia, while avoiding the necessity of any premature or indirect de jure recognition
of the Soviet Government.
To sum up, while accepting your Excellency’s suggestions for a separate Straits
instrument, annexed, however, to tie Peace Treaty, and for the procedure as regards
the admission of Russia, I trust that you wull now see your way to accept my proposal
for the treatment of the Straits question by the main conference at Lausanne.
Touching my suggestion to invoke the assistance of the League of Nations’
secretariat, your Excellency uses the words “ League of Nations’ delegates.” I had m
mind only the loan of the assistance of a technical staff of translators, interpreters and
[128 s—1]