أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [ظ‎‎١‎٣‎٨] (٣٤٨/٢٧٦)

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Dr. Nihad Kechad expressed the utmost alarm at this situation, which had
apparently come upon him as a £reat shock, and he announced his intention of
telegraphing at once to Mustapha Kemal on the point. He believed that he could
reach him by wireless before to-morrow morning.
I suggested that, it there were still time, orders should be given to the Kemalist
cavalry—of whom there were now 4,500—to retire ; and that, even if these orders
came too late and an unfortunate incident occurred, it whs still possible for Mustapfia
Kemal to explain that the incident had been due to an error on the part of his troops,
and to order their instant withdrawal from the neutral zone. It might be too late to
prevent hostilities, but it might still be possible to avert a war.
Dr. Nihad liechad then proceeded to give me his own explanation of the Kemalist
position. He said that Kemal was in great alarm lest, owing to the revolution in
Athens, we were already arranging with the new Greek Government that they should
re-enter the war and join us in the occupation of the Marmora and in the retention of
Ihrace. further, in the event of the Greek troops retiring, as was proposed in the
Paris note, either to the Maritza or to another line in Eastern Thrace, what guarantee
had the lurks as to the nature of the administration to be set up in the evacuated
territory ? 1 hey were desperately afraid that it would not be a Turkish administration,
and that some attempt would be made to rob them of the spoils which they appeared
to have won. It was these doubts more particularly which had restrained Mustapha
Kemal from returning an immediate answer to the Paris proposals—a delay which
Dr. Nihad Rechad, for his own part, joined with me in deeply regretting.
1 replied that, on the two points which he had mentioned, I wotdd be as explicit
with him as 1 had l>een in respect of Chanak. It was not true that so far any step
whatever had been taken to encourage the Greeks. I was not in communication with
the new Government in Athens. I did not even know who they were. I was unaware
of the disposition of their troops, and of their military intentions. We had given
them no encouragement whatsoever in Thrace. On the contrary. Dr. Nihad Rechad
must know quite well that we had obliged the Greek man-of-war to leave Constantinople,
and that we had prohibited Greek transports and vessels of war from entering the
1 Dardanelles. We could not possibly have acted in a more strictly neutral manner.
But I must warn him frankly that, if the incidents which 1 had described resulted in
hostilities, this attitude would at once be changed. There would then be no reason
whatsoever why we should prevent Greece from doing anything that she pleased in
i espect of 1 brace or the Marmora ; and, if Mustapha Kemal chose to fight us, he would
have no cause to be surprised at the re-entry ot Greece upon the scene. As regards
i brace, I ^aid that 1 had not the slightest difficulty in rebutting the suspicions of
Mustapha Kemal. As a matter of fact, the British Government had already had in
contemplation the necessity of instituting a civil administration in those parts of
Eastern i brace which would be evacuated by the Greek army, and, although the
assistance of Allied officers might be required in reporting upon the situation and
setting up an administration, I had always contemplated that it should be in the main
I urkish in character, and that certainly no attempt should be made to get behind the
terms of the Paris note. But how, 1 asked, was this to be brought about if Mustapha
Kemal refrained from coming to Mudania ? Mudania, I repeated, was the first step ;
the line of evacuation was the second; and the setting up of some form of civil
administration was the third. r l hat at such a moment Mustapha Kemal should be in a
train going to Angora instead of expediting these issues so favourable to him, was to
me quite incomprehensible.
Dr. Nihad Rechad asked my permission to include in his message to his chief the
observations which I had just made.
I readily gave him permission, and urged upon him the utmost speed and the most
definite presentation of the case if he was to have any chance of avoiding what we both
regarded as the disastrous contingency of a new war. No one wanted such a war
certainly not Great Britain. But, if it were provoked in the particular circumstances
which I had described, I did not think think that public opinion would be left in the
smallest doubt as to where the responsibility lay.
I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.