أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [ظ‎‎١‎٢‎٣] (٣٤٨/٢٤٦)

2
M. Briand that the final conference should be at Constantinople, where, he thought,
a solution might be more readily obtainable than in Paris or London where the
Council was beset by deputations and exposed to press influences. It would moreover
be difficult to get Mustapha Kemal to come from Angora to Paris or London, the
conference would not of course decline to hear the Greeks and the Turks. Both would
have an opportunity of submitting their views, but there must be no line by line
discussion of the new terms. Both combatants must eventually be told that this was
the treaty on which the Allied Powers were unitedly determined.
•This of course raised certain contingencies for which we must be prepared. The
i / Greeks might refuse. 3^6 had already tried to meet this possibility by seeing the
Greeks both in London and at Cannes. As a result of these conversations the Greeks
had placed themselves in the hands of the Powers and had done so knowing the
general substance, though of course not the details, of the terms they would have to
accept. They knew that they must leave Smyrna and that the Thracian frontier
would have to be thrown back further from Constantinople. For this they were,
broadly speaking, prepared. A refusal on their part was less to be contemplated
than recalcitrance on the part of the Turks. We must therefore be prepared for the
course which the Allies might have to follow in such a case, whether it took the
form of a blockade of the Turkish coast, or of increased facilities or assistance to
the Greeks. Failure on the part of the Allies to impose their decision could only
mean a resumption and continuation of hostilities which it was in the interest of
everyone to avoid. When therefore the Foreign Ministers *me^t they must decide
not only on the new terms, but also on their line of action if the terms to be embodied
in the new treaty were refused.
M Poincare replied that he would at once study Lord Curzon’s memorandum
and send the observations to London in writing, for the French Government might
have both observations and objections to formulate. FTe wished this exchange of notes
to precede the meeting, and he had already suggested to Mr. Lloyd George that such
meetings between the statesmen should only take place when the ground had been
practically cleared and when they were sure of agreement.
Lord Cnrzon replied that not much time need be spent on a preliminary exchange
of notes : the three Powers were, he believed, already near to agreement. Moreover,
the meeting contemplated would be a conversation not a conference. Each repre
sentative would be accompanied only by a few experts. An exchange of notes might
last for weeks. Meanwhile the situation was serious. AVe were already past mid
January. Neither side could nor would fight seriously while the theatre of war was
under snow. But in March or April climatic conditions would again begin to favour
hostilities. Tf they broke out again the last chance of a peacefu 1 settlement would
probably be gone and the Powers would look extremely foolish. Previous written
discussion among them was really unnecessary. They knew each others views. A
speedy settlement was far more likely if they met round a table
M. Poincare replied that he only knew the outline of the British proposals.
He thought they were unlikely to be acceptable to the Turks. Modifications would
probably be necessary, and the French Government would have several observations
to make and would forward them as soon as possible. M. Poincare was prepared
for a conversation, but not for a conference. And the conversations must not take
that character later. Public opinion in France wms at present strongly opposed to
conferences. In the last resort he was not opposed to a meeting at Constantinople,
but it must be a meeting of Foreign Envoys or Ambassadors, and not of Cabinet
■ Ministers. It would be difficult for a French Minister to go there.
Lord Curzon said that he would, of course, be happy to receive any note
M. Poincare wished to send him. He had never expected that his own note would
be accepted at once and in its entirety. But when the Allies were agreed there must
be some means of communicating the new terms to the Greeks and Turks on an
occasion when they would both be present. He agreed that it might be well that
the Ambassadors or High Commissioners at Constantinople should start the
conference, but he doubted whether they would eventually have enough authority
to carry it through. After a few 7 weeks the Greeks, or more probably the Turks,
might prove obstructive and a higher authority would have to be invoked. Either
then Cabinet Ministers would have to go to Constantinople or the Turks and Greeks
brought elsewhere. The High Commissioners alone would probably be insufficient.
History proved this. The- conference at Berlin and every previous attempt to settle
the Eastern Question were cases in point. This was a grave crisis, and the leaders
would have to intervene later, if not now.