أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [و‎‎٩‎٥] (٣٤٨/١٨٩)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty s Government.]
EASTERN (Turkey). r November 3.]
CONFIDENTIAL. Section 1.
[E 12164/1/44] - No. 1 .
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge.
(No. 2863.)
My Lord, Foreign Office, November 3, 1921.
I ASKED the French Ambassador to call upon me this afternoon, in order to
make certain enquiries about the draft of the agreement concluded by M. Franklin-
Bouillon, apparently on behalf of the French Government, with the Turkish Govern
ment at Angora, a copy of which, with an accompanying letter by Yussouf Kemal Bey,
the Foreign Minister of that Government, had been forwarded to us by the French
Foreign Office.
1 reminded the French Ambassador that in the earlier part of the present year
1 had more than once asked M. Briand personally whether M. Franklin-Bouillon had
any official mission, and had been definitely assured by him that he was a private
person—rather a busybody, in fact who was going to Angora for purposes of his own.
Further, in July of the present year, when M. Briand was conducting negotiations with
Bekir Sami Bey on behalf of the Angora Government, M. Briand had in an official
note assured us that no general engagement had been or would be entered into by
France on the general question of peace between the Allies and Turkey without a
close agreement with the Allies, and especially with the British Government. Finally,
when M. Franklin-Bouillon went a second time to Angora in September, and we had
again enquired as to the capacity in which he was acting, the French Government
had admitted that he had some sort of official mission, but M. Briand had added that
he had been forbidden to discuss with the Angora Government the larger questions of
peace, and had been only empowered to negotiate, on behalf of the French Govern
ment, with regard to French .prisoners, the protection of minorities in Cilicia, and
other points involved in the evacuation of Cilicia by French troops.
Relying upon these categorical assurances I had taken no further steps in the
matter, but, on the contrary, had pursued here the policy of close and unwavering
co-operation with the French in every aspect of our Middle Eastern policy. Only
during the last week 1 had been conducting negotiations with the Greek Ministers, and
in spite of their pressure 1 had insisted upon the duty incumbent upon me of acting
only with our Allies, and had only yesterday successfully persuaded the Greeks to
place themselves unreservedly in the hands of the latter. Fresh from this successful
effort in the interests of the Alliance, which I thought boded so well for the future, it
was with feelings of astonishment and almost of dismay that 1 had read the provisions
of M. Franklin-Bouillon’s Agreement, as to which L could not avoid asking a number
of serious questions, and which 1 could hardly believe that the French Government
would be prepared to accept in its present form.
I said that I would hand to the Ambassador a memorandum which he could
transmit to his Government containing the enquiries which I felt bound to make ; but
the principal of them I would indicate in my present remarks.
Whilst, I said, it was a matter of common knowledge that the Allies had agreed
among themselves in the earlier stages of the war not to conclude peace with any enemy
Bower except by common agreement, it appeared from the wording of article 1 of the
Franklin-Bouillon Agreement that a peace had now been concluded between France and
Angora, and, further, inasmuch as the agreement was one with the Grand National
Assembly of Angora, that it amounted to a recognition by the French of that Govern
ment as the Government of Turkey. No mention was made of the Government at
Constantinople, and undoubtedly, if the agreement were ratified in its present form,
Mustapha Kemal’s- Government could claim that they had received recognition from
one of the most powerful of the European Allies.
Article 3 of the agreement, which provided for the withdrawal of French troops,
appeared to run directly counter to article 8 of the Tripartite Agreement of the
10th August, 1920, in which the French had pledged themselves to maintain their
troops in the zone of special French interests until the Allies were satisfied that the
Treaty of Peace with Turkey was being executed, and that the measures accepted by
Turkey for the protection of Christian minorities had been put into force and their
execution effectivelv guaranteed.
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