أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [ظ‎‎٨‎٩] (٣٤٨/١٧٨)

Turkish troops opposed to him were stronger and better equipped than ns o\\n
troops. It is also clear from secret sources that the French are negotiating 01
the direct supply of ammunition to the Kemalists, although actual deli\ei\ seems
to depend on the outcome of the Franklin-Bouillon negotiations at Angola.
Meanwhile both parties are officially celebrating the tremendous victor} that t ie\
have won. Te Deums have been sung at Athens, and public rejoicings ha\e taven
place at Angora. We are reminded of the Battle of Jutland, which we simu -
taneously celebrated as a triumph in London and Berlin.
On the wdiole, however, it seems unlikely that the Kemalists can foi some
time sufficiently remunition themselves or become sufficiently mobile, with w intei
and the rainy weather setting in, to drive the Greeks from the two junctions o
Eskishehr and Afion Karahissar. Though their lines of communication are long
the Greeks have all the railways, other than the short stretch of the Anatolian
and Baghdad beyond Tchai to Cilicia, and, if they can enforce it against the French
and Italians, the command of the sea communications, other than those between
Trebizond and Batum. A stalemate with both sides exhausted has been Geneial
Harington’s forecast up to now r , and this seems probable but not certain. On the
other hand time seems to be on the side of the Turks since if the Greek troops
cannot be demobilised, their moral is likely to suffer during the winter months in
the trenches, subject to continuous raids and in the middle of a hostile country. If
the situation changes at all it seems likely to be against the Greeks, h rom the
military point of view the moment for intervention by the Allies would appear
therefore to be propitious.
I now’ turn to the political attitude of the Greeks.
After the meeting of the Supreme Council in Paris in August and before the
Greek retreat, Lord Granville sounded the Greek Prime Minister regarding his
peace aims. They appeared to be a “ strategic frontier for the Smyrna zone,
apparently pushed north to the Sea of Marmara to include Brusa, and some form
of autonomous international State for the Straits and Constantinople, in the
administration of which Greece would participate with the principal Allies.
About the same time there were indications that the Greek Government believed
that His Majesty’s Government would support a Greek entry into Constantinople.
The idea seems to have been reluctantly dropped after strong representations by
Lord Granville and a Reuter statement, and in an interview at Brusa just before
the Greek retirement King Constantine w 7 as reported to have admitted that he
realised that the Allies would not allow the Greeks to go to Constantinople, at any
rate “for the present.” Since the Greek retirement there has been no clear
indication from Athens whether mediation would be acceptable or what terms
Greece would now accept. On the one hand Lord Granville reported on the
19th September that all the papers seemed to agree that the time had come when
the Government must at last make a great diplomatic effort in order to secure the
acquiescence of Powers in suitable terms of peace, and that the general tone of
the press indicated that mediation would be welcome. On the other hand he
telegraphed on the 21st September that M. Gounaris, “ who was not at all
cheerful,” had said “ no ” to an enquiry whether the Greeks meant to take the first
step towards negotiation with Kemal. They would hold the line decided upon
and see what happened. “ Gounaris made no allusion to mediation.’ In a more
recent statement to the press (26th September), M. Gounaris announced that
“ the Greeks must organise the occupied territory so as to defend it with the least
possible sacrifices and expense, and w 7 e shall proceed to that organisation making
it as complete as possible.”
In August, before Parliament rose, M. Gounaris suggested a visit to London
to see the Prime Minister and myself. The moment was, for many reasons,
inopportune, and the reply w T as sent that the middle of October w r ould be a better
season. M. Gounaris has now revived the proposal, but has not yet been given
a definite date. Until he comes he is not very likely to indicate with any
precision how the Greeks view the situation or what terms they wdll accept.
Meanwhile his own position seems to be somewhat insecure. Rival politicians
are believed to have obtained the ear of the King, and, although M. Gounaris may
survive the expected crisis, his Ministry does not seem likely to be long-lived.
Such information as w’e have regarding the internal situation in Greece
(necessity of floating an internal loan, drachma at 78, calling up of the 1922 class,
an admitted shortage of reserves) points to the Greeks (even if they believe that
they can hold the Eskishehr line, wdiich is uncertain) being ready to accept Allied
mediation if the Allies are at all insistent and if sufficiently “ face-saving ” terms