أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [و‎‎٨‎٩] (٣٤٨/١٧٧)

iThis Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government,]
No. 1 SECRETARY OF STATE.
EASTERN (Turret) [October 7.] , j
CONFIDENTIAL. Section 1.
| E 11096/143/44 ] No. 1.
Intervention between Greece and Turkey.
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
TWO of my colleagues have written notes urging an immediate or early
intervention in the struggle, which appears to have reached a position of
stalemate between the Greeks and the Turks. They may be sure that the idea
of such intervention at the first moment consistent with a reasonable chance of
success has never been absent from my mind since the rejection by the Greeks of
the last offer made by the Allies after my visit to Paris in June. But the
problem is not to be solved by the mere expression of an d priori desire; and
I will here endeavour to state, for the assistance of the Cabinet in arriving at
a decision, the main conditions of the problem, as it now presents itself. The
story will necessarily be rather a long one.
The first point to he determined is the military situation. Since the Greeks
early in September failed to break through to Angora and retired west of the
Sakharia, the Greek objective has apparently been to occupy a line about 20 miles
east of Eskishehr, extending in front of Afion Karahissar, and some 16 miles
south-eastwards along the Anatolian Railway, and to hold on to this territory as
territory conquered in war, organising its administration on the lines of the zone
round Smyrna. It is difficult, however, from the information reaching us, and
while the situation changes from day to day, to form a clear opinion of the state
of either belligerent’s army.
As regards the Greeks, Sir H. Rumbold telegraphed on the 18th September
that, although -the Greeks had fought remarkably well, the moral of their staff
appeared to be shaken and the Turks seemed to be working round both flanks. It
remained to be seen whether retirement could be carried out in good order.
General Harington also telegraphed on the 22nd September that he had received
General Papoulas’s appreciation of the situation, “ which was that of a beaten man
seeing the enemy threatening him everywhere.” He added that the Greeks might
succeed in stopping on the Eskishehr line if the weather broke there as it had at
Constantinople. Again Lord Granville telegraphed on the 26th September that his
Italian colleague had good information that the Turks had completely cut the
communications between Afion Karahissar and Ushak; that they were encircling
the right wing of the Greek army, whose moral was low but discipline not lost.
On the 23rd September Lord Granville telegraphed that the Greek Minister of
Finance had informed his French colleague that the Greeks would defend
Eskishehr, but if the Turks succeeded in driving them thence, the Greeks might
consider themselves defeated and the campaign might be abandoned.
On the other hand, Major Johnston, General Harington’s liaison officer with
the Greeks, reported on the 20th September that the Greeks were “ destroying the
railway west of the Sakharia by blowing up each rail,” and were laying waste the
country. The Greeks, although their losses were said to have been 23,000 against
Turkish 17,000, “were not in danger, and the retreat will be carried out safely.”
General Harington also telegraphed on the 23rd September that “ the Greek army
appears to be holding its own and retiring in good order on positions previously
decided upon, despite the fact that the Turks are showing great energy and ability
in carrying out cavalry raids.”
As regards the Turks our information is more meagre. Secret messages
indicated, however, that, just before the Greek retreat, the Turks were very short
of ammunition and guns and equally short of motor lorries and petrol. We know,
however, that they are receiving ammunition in coasting boats from Batum, and
General Harington admits a leakage from Constantinople, apparently from stores
under French control, which the Greek warships can only partially stop in the
Black Sea. General Papoulas even admitted to General Harington that the
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