أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [و‎‎٨‎٥] (٣٤٨/١٦٩)

EASTERN.
[June 1 ; 4.]
CONFIDENTIAL.
Section 1,
E 7279/143/44]
No. 1.
Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan {Rome).
(No. 533.)
Sir,
Foreign Office, June 24, 1921.
THE Italian Ambassador, having asked to see me to present a message from
Count Sforza, commenced by reading out a telegram from the latter, in which the
Italian Foreign Minister deplored the lack of union which had recently characterised
the policy of the Allied Powers in the East; suggested that, before resuming the
discussion of this question at the next meeting of the Supreme Council, there should
be a confidential exchange of views between them; trusted that from this examination
there might emerge a new and harmonious Allied policy for those parts of the
world; and ended by reviving the suggestion, which Signor de Martino had at an
earlier date placed before me, namely, that there might be a resumption of the
discussions, which had been initiated with Lord Grey just-before the commencement
of the war, concerning a Mediterranean agreement between Italy and Great Britain.
I said at once that no one was more disposed than myself to maintain the close
harmony between the Allies, which had been the accepted basis of our action during
the -past few years, and to which, for my own part, I had been wholly loyal; but I
felt bound to tell his Excellency that, in view of the recent policy and actions of
Count Sforza himself, a more unfavourable moment for opening discussions as to a
closer alliance or understanding could not, in my opinion, have been found, and that
before I even entered into a discussion on the matter I should have to be convinced
that there was a radical change in the attitude and policy of Count Sforza himself.
While Signor Nitti's Government was in power there had been, as testified at
numerous conferences, a close unity of spirit and action between our two
Governments. We had almost always, at any rate in European politics, been found
to take the same view, and we had jointly exercised our influence in the pacification
of Europe. Since Count Sforza, however, had become Foreign Minister, he had
preferred to pursue an Asiatic policy of his own. which was not only independent of
ours, but in many respects quite inconsistent with it, and the recent symptoms of
which had caused me the gravest surprise and alarm.
I then referred to the conversation which Sir Eyre Crowe, acting upon my
instructions, had recently held with his Excellency, and I said that it was probably
not necessary for me to do more than to recapitulate the main points, although I
had something further to add .to them. It was somewhat astonishing to hear a
complaint from Count Sforza of lack of unity between the Allies when he himself
was mainly responsible for it. What was the good of talking about an alliance,
when one of the Allies thought it open to him, while actually engaged in a conference
with the others, to conclude an agreement behind their backs, or at any rate behind
the back of one—namely, England—in which he openly pledged himself to support
an enemy Power, in this case the Angora Government, against the Allied body of
which he himself was a member, and against a treaty upon which his own signature
was still wet? I had as yet heard no explanation or defence of this procedure, and
I remained lost in astonishment at it.
The second point in which Count Sforza had claimed a liberty, inconsistent
with any conception of an alliance, as I understood it, was that of the recent agree
ment which he had concluded at Rome with a mission from Afghanistan. Here
again I was at a loss to understand how the Italian Government could reconcile
such procedure with the sentiments which they now professed. If the defence w^ere
offered that Afghanistan was an independent State, the answer was at once clear,
that no one knew better than the Italians,^ with their ramification of agents through
out the East, what were the real relations between Afghanistan and Great Britain,
and how predominant had been for the last eighty years, and must continue for
geographical reasons to be, the political influence of Great Britain at Kabul. If
Count Sforza’s proceedings were so innocent, why had he omitted to tell us what he
was doing ? I understood his defence now to be that Italy had commercial relations
with Afghanistan which he was desirous of maintaining. I had yet to find anyone
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