أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [ظ‎‎٨‎١] (٣٤٨/١٦٢)

could hardly leave Smyrna while the offensive was pending, although his alleged ill-healt i
was perhaps designed to meet this difficulty. There were also political-difficulties at
Athens, but acceptance by the Greeks would really depend on their conti denee m
impending hostilities.
As regards Thrace, M. Briand pointed out that it was the interest of the Allies to
effect the transference of the Government from Angora to Constantinople, in which
place the Turkisk-Government could be more readily ..controlled. But the Nationalists
would refuse to come to Constantinople as long as the Greeks threatened its suburbs.
The treaty solution of the question was both geographically and ethnically illogical.
He would therefore suggest the creat ion of an international zone in 1 hi ace
under an international gendarmerie. He was in favour of the early evacution of
Constantinople. ‘
With regard to finance, in which French interests were paramount, he would he
willing to seek a method of securing essential control that would not offend Nationalist
susceptibilities.
The Turks, he said, regarded the “ zones of influence” of the tripartite agreement
as the worst encroachment on Turkish sovereignty, but might be prepared to give
freely all the concessions desired. M. Briand would be willing, on behalf of France, to
renounce the tripartite agreement, and thought it might be possible to induce Italy to
do the same once her economic interests were secured in some other manner.
He was opposed to accompanying the submission of the Allied proposals to the
Turks by threats, as he feared this would endanger acceptance.
Lastly, he said, the French Government were in entire agreement with the general
proposals of His Majesty’s Government, and had in fact been about to make a similar
proposal for mediation.
Lord Curzon welcomed this evidence of Franeo-British unanimity, and-hoped that
Italian adherence could be obtained.
With regard to Thrace, any proposal to modify the treaty had lapsed when the
scheme for a commission of enquiry was abandoned in London. M. Briand had not
referred to his own proposal, but had suggested instead an autonomous Thrace. This
His Majesty’s Government could not accept Moreover, it would be useless to offer
mediation at Athens on condition of the abandonment of Thrace as well as Smyrna.
With regard to threats, he pointed out that M. Briand was under a misapprehension
if he thought it was proposed to threaten the Greeks in any way ; so far from
threatening them, it was intended to offer them help in the future should the Turks
refuse our proposals. It would, however, be necessary, while offering such great
concessions to Turkey, to have a threat in readiness in the event of refusal, and he
knew, from his experience of the East, that a stick behind the back w r as very useful in
dealing with Orientals.
With regard to procedure, M. Briand had suggested simultaneous action at Athens,
Constantinople and Angora. He pointed out that it was essential to approach the
Greeks first, for otherwise they would say that the Allies had trapped them.
With regard to finance, he welcomed M. Briand’s offer of further modifications.
He strongly welcomed the generosity and statesmanship displayed by M. Briand
in assenting to the abrogation of the tripartite agreement, and he counted on French
co-operation at Rome. M. Briand had said nothing as to the plans for approaching
the Turks, but he gratefully accepted his offer of united action in the proposed
negotiations.
Further, M. Briand had said nothing in regard to the command at Constantinople ;
he must emphasise this point, as it was of the utmost importance as a demonstration of
Allied unity. '
M. Briand in reply said that he agreed to offering mediation first at Athens and
subsequently approaching the Turks. He was ready to endeavour to secure Italian
aims under the tripartite agreement by other methods, as, for example, a Turkish offer
of free concessions.
He enquired whether His Majesty’s Government could not, on their part, meet the
Turkish demands in regard to Mesopotamia.
Lord Curzon said that he was ignorant of these demands, and that he considered
it preferable not to raise the question of mandated territories. There was a further
difficulty, in that Mesopotamia was now dealt with by the Colonial Office and not by
the Foreign Office. He would, however, be interested to know what it was that the
Turks had asked.