أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [و‎‎٧‎٢] (٣٤٨/١٤٣)

CIRCULATED TO THE CABINE T,
[5791 r —Ij xd
i This Docum ent is the Prop e rty of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.]
EASTERN.
[March 17.]
CONFIDENTIAL.
Section 1.
[E 3432/55/58] No. 1 .
Karl Curzon to Colonel Stokes (Batonm).
(No. 22.)
Sir, Foreign Office, March 17, 1921.
M. TCHENKELI, the recently-appointed Georgian representative to the capitals
of Paris, London and Rome, called upon me at the Foreign Office this afternoon in
order to descant upon the misfortunes of his country, and to ask the advice of the
British Government as to the course they had better pursue.
He did not seem to be very well acquainted with the latest position of affairs in
Georgia, which, no doubt, is changing from day to day, and was under the impression
that the l urks had marched into Batoum, not, as our information went to show, with
the knowledge if not at the instigation of the Georgian Government in order to save
that place from being seized bv the Bolsheviks, but as a movement of aggression on
their own part. He was conscious, however, that his Government was in a desperate
plight, and was anxious to find in any directioif an alleviation for its pains.
1 told him that, sorry as I was for the misfortunes of Georgia, who had had no
better friend than myself during the events of the last tw'o years, I felt that she had
to some extent brought them upon herself. The only barrier that could have been
successfully opposed to the Bolshevik advance in the Caucasus was a solid union or
confederation of the three Caucasian States. I had impressed this upon the Georgian
representatives with all the insistence of which I was capable at San Remo nearly a
year ago, and my private secretary, Mr. R. Vansittart, had devoted hours of time to
inducing the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijan representatives to conclude an
agreement. This had broken down owing to the short-sighted obstinacy of the
Georgians alone; the point at issue being the facilities to be given for access from
Armenia to the sea. For this cardinal mistake the Georgians had since been paying,
the penalty. Further, she did not seem to me to have utilised the interval to
consolidate her armed strength or her national existence in the degree which might
have been expected, while, from the rapidity with which her forces had dwindled
and her Government been submerged, it was clear to me that a large portion of
the population must he themselves in sympathy with the Soviet attack. In these
circumstances, I did not see what Great Britain or the Powers could do at the moment
to save Georgia from a situation which she had to a large extent brought upon herself.
M. Tchenkeli seemed to be very much hurt that he had not been heard at the
recent conference, which had given so full a hearing to the Turks, Greeks and other
parties.
I told h im that I thought this complaint was without justification, since the
question of Georgia was not raised by the Treaty of Sevres.
On the other hand, I informed him that we had done our best for Georgia in our
conferences with the Turkish delegates from Angora, and that though we could not in
all probability exercise any* influence upon what was happening on the northern frontiers
of Georgia, or on their relations with the Bolsheviks, we would certainly do our best to
secure the recognition of their independent existence and the determination of their
frontiers on the southern side by arrangement with the Turks.
We had found, in conversation with Bekir Sami Beyq that the latter himself was
strongly in favour of a Caucasian confederation as a barrier between the Turks and the
Bolsheviks, and he had indicated that, instead of desiring to retain Batoum, as
M. r l chenkeli appeared to be convinced, the Turkish occupation of this town and
neighbourhood was intended only to be temporary in character.
I suggested that, in the light of what I had told him, M. Tchenkeli, who was
about to leave for Paris, and who was already acquainted with Bekir Sami Bey, should
at once reopen conversations with the latter and endeavour to secure from him friendly
assurances in this respect. He might then come back to England and inform me of
what he had done.