أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [و‎‎٦‎٩] (٣٤٨/١٣٧)

/- - ■
CIRCULATED TO THE CABINET.
[This Docnment is the Property of His Britannic Majesty s Groverr.nicnt. i
No. 2 PRIVATE SECRETARY.
EASTEEN. [February 16.]
CONFIDENTIAL. Section 1.
[E 2184/1/44] No. 1 .
Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).
(No. 515.)
My Lord, Foreign Office, February 16, 1921.
THE French Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and raised the following
points in the course of our conversation :—
Firstly, he presented an urgent request from M. Briand that we should not, in
deference either to the convenience of the Turkish Nationalist Party or to the
representations of the Italian Government, agree to postpone the date of the meeting
of the conference on the Treaty of Sevres summoned to begin on Monday nest.
I assured the Ambassador that we had no such intention, and that I had formally
communicated our views to the Italian Ambassador. Even if the Angora delegation
had not arrived or had not made up its differences with the Constantinople delegation,
there would be plenty of business to occupy the Conference in the first day or two of
its sittings.
The Ambassador assured me that M. Briand would be greatly relieved by this
declaration.
Secondly, he desired to bring to my notice that the French military detachment,
like the Italian, was about to leave Palestine.
Thirdly, he asked me whether it might not be a good thing, with a view to
producing a favourable atmosphere among the Turks before their arrival in London,
to release the Turkish prisoners of war detained since the war at Malta.
I replied that I could not for the moment and without reference remember how
many they were or what were the offences for which they had been confined ; but I
was under the impression that some, though perhaps not the majority of them, had
either been guilty of cruel acts during the war or had been embittered opponents of
the Allied cause. I would look into the matter, but even supposing release were
practicable it would seem to me to be better policy to hold the concession in reserve
until we saw how the Turkish representatives were going to act, instead of giving it
away in advance.
ITis Excellency next informed me that his Government was strongly of opinion
that the total figure of German reparation, which under the Treaty of Versailles had
to be fixed before the 1 st May, should be determined at once by the members of the
Reparation Commission sitting in Paris. It would not of course be possible to arrive
at more than an approximate figure, but it was essential that this should be done, and
he begged that instructions should be given to Sir John Bradbury to the same effect.
Lastly, he enquired whether I had any information as to an impending advance by
the Greek forces in Asia Minor.
1 replied that we had more than once heard that such a movement was in
contemplation, but that it was not viewed favourably by our military authorities either
here or at Constantinople, partly because they were doubtful of its success and partly
because it was really apolitical move intended to prejudge the issues before the coming
Conference. At the same time, I said, we could not actually prevent the Greeks from
undertaking it if they chose My own inclination was to think that if any real risk
were to be attached to it they would shy off at the last moment.
The Ambassador shared this view, but suggested that the real object of the move
ment, if undertaken, might be to revive the waning spirit of the Greek soldiery.
I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.