أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [و‎‎٤‎٦] (٣٤٨/٩١)

3
II.
Answer to American Note on the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.
(Approved by the Supreme Council at San Remo on April 26, 1920. I.G.P.—X09 (2).)
THE Allied Governments value the frank expression of the views of the United
States Government. They have, however, necessarily deferred a reply to the note ol
the Secretary of the State" Department until the terms of the Treaty have been suffi
ciently formulated to be submitted to the Supreme Council now assembled at San
Remo.
The Council notes that the United States Government do not propose to be
represented by a plenipotentiary at the Conference charged with negotiating the
Treaty of Peace with Turkey, otherwise than in the capacity ot an observer, from
which it follows that the United States Government do not intend to become signa
tories to the Treaty.
The Council welcomes, however, the assurance borne out by the presence ol the
United States Ambassador at Rome that the United States maintain theii close
interest in the terms of the settlement, and is happy to take this occasion to afiord the
United States Government further information and explanations concerning the
terms agreed upon before Mr. Johnson s arrival, the Allied Governments do not
interpret Mr. Colby’s desire for such information to mean that the negotiation with
Turkey should be delayed until each of the particular points raised in his note has
been exhaustively discussed with the United States Government, and an agreement
with them arrived at. This would, indeed, in existing circumstances have rendered
all fruitful negotiations impossible. .
The Allied Governments have never concealed their wish to see the United Mates
associated in the preparation and signature of the 1 reaty which is to embody the
re-settlement of Turkey on a just and lasting basis. In the hope and expectation of
American participation they had delayed the negotiations with 1 urkey at the risk
of gravely imperilling the prospect of any satisfactory settlement being efiected
without a fresh recourse to arms. They fully understand and appreciate the reasons
for which the United States Government have not, finally, seen their way to become
parties to the Treaty. The burden of the negotiation—which has not been lightened
by the long delay which has unhappily, but in the circumstances unavoidably, inter
vened—has therefore fallen on the Allies alone. They have readily accepted it, and
have endeavoured to discharge an increasingly difficult duty to the best of their ability
and judgment. They feel confident that the settlement which they are about to
propose to the Turkish Government will be found in harmony with the principles and
ideals which have inspired them, in common with the United States, in waging war
and in concluding peace with Turkey’s late allies. I he desire of the United States
Government that the Treaty shall be fair and just to all parties is entirely shared
by the Allied Governments. When, however, it is urged that the settlement shall
be made “ with scrupulous regard for the interests of victor, vanquished and neutral,”
it must be remembered that there cannot in justice be equality of consideration on
the one hand for the interests of the Turks who wantonly joined Germany and
Austria-Hungary in their war of agression, and on the other hand for the interests
of the former subject races of Turkey whom the Allies, at immense sacrifices of life
and treasure, have delivered from Turkish misrule.
The Allied Governments now pass to the consideration of the specific points
raised in Mr. Colby’s note.
1. With regard to Constantinople the advantages and disadvantages of exclud
ing the Sultan’s Government from any territory in Europe, have been very carefully
weighed. An exhaustive examination of the problem in all its bearings had convinced
the "Allied Governments that, supposing such a policy to be in itself desirable, its
adoption would entail upon them responsibilities, dangers and sacrifices which, with
due regard to their own national interests and obligations, they are not in a position
safely to incur. At the same time the Allied Governments recognise that the prob
lem might have presented itself in a different light if those responsibilities, dangers
and sacrifices were not to be borne by themselves alone but shared by the United
States of America. . 1 „ • , •
2. The southern frontier of Turkey lias been drawn alter due consideration not
onlv of the ethnical but also of the economic and geographical factors involved. The
United States Government will readily recognise that as in the case of the other