أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [ظ‎‎٣‎١] (٣٤٨/٦٢)

On the 6th July you informed me that the Supreme Council had appointed
Colonel Haskell, of the United States army, to he High Commissioner for Armenia on
behalf of the Allied and Associated Governments. No provision, however, was made
for any material force for his support.
About the middle of July the reports from the military authorities began to show
that the fears entertained as to the helpless position of the Armenian Christians were
not unlikely to be fulfilled, and that fighting had already broken out in the
Nakhitchevan district. Appeals for help from many and various sources reached me in
large numbers, uniformly arguing that if our decision to withdraw were adhered to and
no one were to take our place massacres might be expected to occur on an unprecedented
scale.
Meanwhile, however, the immediate risk of a collision between the Georgians and
Tartars on the one hand and the Volunteer Army ot General Denikin on the other
had been in a measure averted by the drawing of a dividing line between them, which
both sides agreed to respect. In addition to this I deputed Mr. Oliver Wardrop, an
official well acquainted with the country and the people, on a political mission to Tifiis,
with instructions to use his influence to prevent friction between General Denikin and
the Georgian and the Azerbaijan Governments, to appoint subordinate officers as his
representatives in the more important towns, and to endeavour by every means at his
disposal to avert the anticipated massacre of the Armenians.
On the 9th August I received your suggestion that while our troops were being
withdrawn an attempt should be made to interest the United States Government, as
the possible future mandatory for Armenia, in the subject of the Caucasus, and that we
might even delay the concluding stages of our withdrawal if we could induce them to
send military forces to take the place of our troops. An enquiry from the War Office
showed that any delay in the evacuation, which had indeed already begun, would
present almost insuperable difficulties, owing in the main to the fact that the British
troops were overdue for demobilisation and could not be pressed to remain in the
Caucusus. I then saw the American Ambassador, and placed the whole matter before
him (see my despatch No. 459 of the 11th August). Mr. Davis did- not, however, hold
out much hope that his Government would intervene. On the 18th August I saw
Mr. Davis again and told him that the Powers in France, and we in London, were
waiting for the Americans to decide upon the question of accepting a mandate. His
Excellency again, however, expressed the opinion that it was improbable that his
Government would see their way to taking any action in the sense desired by us. On
the 19th August I wrote to the American Ambassador calling his attention to a
statement made by Mr. Bonar Law in the House ot Commons, to the eftect that the
Armenian problem was an American rather than a British one, that any offers of
assistance from the United States Government would be very welcome, and, further,
that if President Wilson were officially to say to His Majesty’s Government: “We
wish you to hold the fort for a little until we can make arrangements,” His Majesty’s
Government would certainly do their best to meet him. I asked Mr. Davis to find out
by telegraph whether his Government would either send troops themselves or would
be willing to bear the financial burden of the continued retention of ours in the
Caucasus.
Mr. Davis replied on the 29th August that for various technical reasons concerned
with the sanction of the Congress the American Government could do neither of these
things. His Excellency went on to say that his Government made an official appeal to
His Majesty’s Government not to withdraw the British forces in the Caucasus on the
ground that massacres would inevitably result, and that the United States Govern
ment, while realising our difficulties in the matter, considered that we should be held
responsible in the eyes of the civilised world.
All hope of practical assistance from America was therefore at an end.
Meanwhile, on the 20th August, I had, through the medium of the War Office,
consulted General Milne by telegram as to the possibility of mitigating the consequences
of evacuation by all or any of the following steps:—
1. Postponement of the withdrawal of the Indian native troops.
2. The supply of fresh British troops, if these were imperatively required, from our
forces at Constantinople.
3. The supply of military escorts to the political officers appointed to the principal
towns in the Caucasus.
4. The leaving behind of tanks, armoured cars, and aeroplanes.